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Abstract
We understand the term serendipity to describe a creative process that develops, in context, with the active
participation of a creative agent, but not entirely within that agent’s control. While a system cannot be
made to perform serendipitously on demand, nevertheless, we argue that its serendipity potential can be
increased by means of a suitable system architecture and other design choices. We distil a unified descrip-
tion of serendipitous occurrences from historical theorisations of serendipity and creativity. This takes the
form of a framework with six phases: perception, attention, interest, explanation, bridge, and valuation.
We then use this framework to organise a survey of literature in cognitive science, philosophy, and com-
puting, which yields practical definitions of the six phases, along with heuristics for implementation. We
use the resulting model to evaluate the serendipity potential of four existing systems developed by oth-
ers, and two systems previously developed by two of us. Whereas most existing research that considers
serendipity in a computing context deals with serendipity as a service, we relate theories of serendipity
to artificial intelligence practice and the development of autonomous systems. We outline representative
directions for future applications of our model in the domains of automated programming, recommender
systems, and computational creativity. We conclude that it is feasible to equip computational systems with
the potential for serendipity, and that this could be beneficial in varied artificial intelligence applications,
particularly those designed to operate responsively in real-world contexts.
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1. Introduction
Penicillin, the Velcro™ strip, and 3M’s ubiquitous Post-it® Notes have changed everyday lives in
both big and small ways. However, each of these scientific advances and paramount inventions had an
unexpected component. Alexander Fleming discovered the antibiotic properties of penicillum notatum via
contaminated Petri dishes. Georges de Mestral had the idea that little hooks like those found in burrs stuck
to his dog’s fur could be useful for something and not simply a nuisance. And 3M’s most well-known
product goes back to Spencer Silver’s unsought finding [230] of a high-tack, low-peel, adhesive that no
one was initially sure how to use. His original task had been gluing aeroplanes together [78]. In each
of these examples, we see serendipity at work: radical changes in the evaluation of what’s interesting,
followed by an outcome in which the initially unexpected turns out to be both explicable and useful.
Given its crucial role in human discovery and invention, it is not surprising that the concept of
serendipity has been adopted for users’ benefit by many subfields of computer science such as infor-
mation retrieval [6, 223], recommender systems [124] and planning [36, 164]. For example, the SerenA
project, developed by Maxwell et al. [147], aimed to support users in forming bridging connections from
an unexpected encounter to a previously unanticipated but valuable outcome by drawing on linked data
from the web. With Auralist, Zhang et al. [248] present a case-study on serendipity in music recommen-
dation, where they suggest music that is intended to be both interesting and unexpected for their users.
They increase unexpectedness by means of a declustering algorithm on item popularity and user profile
similarity. Chakraborti et al. [36] develop a formal account of planning for serendipity in human-robot
interaction: they describe an urban search and rescue scenario where a person must conduct triage in
a certain room, and then experiences serendipity when the robot intercepts “him with a medkit in the
hallway so he need not fetch one himself.”
Crucially, all of these examples use the concept of serendipity to denote and design systems which
stimulate the experience of serendipity in their users. They realise what we call serendipity as a service.
In this article, we propose to switch perspectives from “serendipity as a service” to “serendipity in the
system,” where artificial systems catalyse, evaluate and leverage serendipitous occurrences themselves.
This perspective shift requires a more nuanced understanding of serendipity: for example, we can
consider a reversal of roles in which a person contributes to a system’s experience of serendipity, in some
suitable sense. However, our central goal is to theorise, and indicate in broad terms how to engineer,
systems which do not depend on such support by people, but which have the capacity to detect, evaluate
and use serendipitous events without user intervention. Why might such features be useful? Consider the
following point raised by de la Maza [59]: “How disastrous it would be if a discovery system’s greatest
discovery was ‘not noticed’ because a human did not have the ability to recognise it!”
Contrary, it would seem, to de la Maza’s hopes, van Andel has suggested that an artificial system
could never be independent of a person in leveraging serendipity.
“Like all intuitive operating, pure serendipity is not amenable to generation by a computer.
The very moment I can plan or programme ‘serendipity’ it cannot be called serendipity any-
more. All I can programme is, that, if the unforeseen happens, the system alerts the user
and incites him to observe and act by himself by trying to make a correct abduction of the
surprising fact or relation.” [230]
We fully agree that an artificial system cannot be guaranteed to engage in serendipitous findings, just as
a person cannot deliberately force serendipity to happen “on demand.” However, we still believe that
serendipity can happen independently of human intervention within an artificial system, and that the
“serendipity potential” of such a system can be increased by means of a suitable system architecture.
In a comparable human context, Louis Pasteur, who is known for his serendipitous discoveries in
chemistry and biology [85, 186], famously remarked: “Dans les champs de l’observation le hasard ne
favorise que les esprits préparés” (“In the fields of observation chance favours only preparedminds”) [173,
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p. 131].1 “Preparedness” encompasses various ways in which the serendipity potential of an intelligent
system can be enhanced.
The framework that we advance was inspired by earlier work of Pease et al. [178], who explored
ways to encourage processes of discovery “in which chance plays a crucial role” within computational
models of creativity. Simonton [201] had previously drawn relationships between serendipity, creativ-
ity, and evolutionary processes. Of particular interest for his analysis were generative processes which
are “independent of the environmental conditions of the occasion of their occurrence” [31], including
combinatorial as well as random processes—a condition understood to imply teleological “blindness.” In
a creativity setting, this condition means that one cannot accurately predict the underlying “fitness” of
different ideational variants [201, p. 159]. Simonton cites BACON [129] as an example of a blind but
nonetheless “systematic” search program, based on “heuristic methods in which a solution is no longer
guaranteed” [201, p. 169].
If the condition of blindness itself came in degrees, we might expect to see the propagation of “pre-
diction error” through a broader system that works to reduce surprise over the long term. This is the
main tenet of predictive processing theories of mental organisation, which for embodied agents extends
to active inference, whereby the results of action inform the update of beliefs [83]. “Avoiding surprises
means that one has to model and anticipate a changing and itinerant world,” and importantly, “average
surprise or entropyH(s |m) is a function of sensations and the agent (model) predicting them” [82]. Note
that reducing such measures over the long term can encourage exploration over shorter time scales. Ap-
plications of these ideas in AI and robotics have received recent attention [135, 153, 222]. We allude to
this work in framing our model of serendipity as a process that itself creates models on the fly, though we
aim here at a practical rather than a formal treatment.
Corneli and Jordanous [48] took preliminary steps towards the system orientation that we will de-
velop, and also considered how social infrastructures might implement several of the serendipity patterns
noted by van Andel [230]. We are aware of recent frameworks designed to help build systems that sup-
port the experience of serendipity in their users [156, 168]: that work testifies to the broader interest that
modelling serendipity holds within current computing research, but is different from our present aim.
We evaluate the concept of serendipity potential qualitatively by assessing representative existing sys-
tems against our framework. This allows us to identify specific challenges for those who would seek the
full and robust implementation of automated systems with serendipity potential. We argue that users
and other stakeholders of autonomous systems could benefit from the effort that will be needed to pro-
duce such implementations, and describe potential applications in the domains of recommender systems,
computational creativity and automated programming.
Broadly, we see this work as a contribution to machine discovery, a topic that has been of interest
throughout the history of AI research and is increasingly relevant in contemporary applications. Indeed,
Herbert Simon contended that “a large part of the research effort in the domain of ‘machine learning’ is
really directed at ‘machine discovery’” [199, p. 29]. Since serendipity has often played an important role
in human discovery, it makes sense to ask whether there is a way of interpreting it in a computational
context. We develop such an interpretation in this paper.
Great strides have been made in applications of machine discovery, including both autonomous and
mixed-initiative software systems [136, 242]. Funding initiatives, such as feasibility studies proposed by
the UK’s EPSRC [70, 71], highlight the potential for a step change in the physical sciences brought about
by the application of AI technologies. Artificial intelligence is also increasingly applied in business an-
alytics, which must deal with small and medium-sized collections of data as well as big data [123, 146].
Writing in Nature, Nic Fleming [80] suggests that “AI and machine learning will usher in an era of
1Van Andel pointed out (p.c.) that Pasteur’s manuscript actually says “Dans les champs de l’observation, le hasard ne favorise
que des esprits préparés” [28]—“In the fields of observation chance favours only some prepared minds.”
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quicker, cheaper and more-effective drug discovery.” The question as to whether or not serendipity can
play a useful role in automated discovery is ultimately an empirical one. In this paper we supply ground-
work for a rigorous investigation of whether and how serendipity potential could improve performance in
automated discovery tasks. We suspect that designing systems with serendipity potential will bring about
more and better discoveries, enhance usability, and allow future systems to operate effectively in more
complex and dynamically-changing environments—but for now, these are speculations, not claims.
The current work makes the following concrete contributions towards the future development of sys-
tems with serendipity potential, and towards their rigorous analysis.
• In this introduction, we have identified a strong bias in the existing technical literature towards
supporting serendipity in the user, and proposed a perspective shift from serendipity as a service to
serendipity in the system. We have embraced the concept of serendipity potential in response to a
classic objection to the generation of serendipity by computational means.
• In Section 2, we draw on a review of prior literature on the concept of serendipity to juxtapose
existing theories and models of serendipity, in order to summarise the logical structure of serendip-
itous occurrences. We understand serendipity in terms of discovery, invention and creativity, and
draw connections to the associated literature to create a unified framework.
• In Section 3, we synthesise a process-oriented model of systems with serendipity potential which
can be used to understand and qualitatively evaluate the serendipity potential of a system. We
provide indicative definitions of each of six constituent phases, perception, attention, interest, ex-
planation, bridge, and valuation, based on the existing treatment of these topics in theoretical
literature. We look at how people have previously approached implementation of the framework’s
individual components, and summarise heuristics that may be gleaned from that work.
• In Section 4, we provide a demonstration of our model by evaluating the serendipity potential of
several documented systems developed by others.
• In Section 5 we evaluate a series of related systems developed in previous work by two of the
authors, and describe how features of the model came online as time went by.
• In Section 6 we discuss in turn: related work; potential directions for further use, development, and
formalisation of the model; and the ways in which the model may inform future applications.
• In Section 7 we put forth our conclusion that equipping computational systems with serendipity
potential would be widely applicable across different artificial intelligence applications. We em-
phasise that our focus is on open discovery, and that the model has particular relevance for future
autonomous systems.
2. The structure of serendipitous occurrences: a unified framework derived from a literature re-
view
To capture the intricate concept of serendipity in a model that is amenable to computational implemen-
tation, we first need a thorough understanding of the concept. Our objective in this section is therefore to
identify the factors common to existing theories of serendipity in one unified interpretation. We will draw
on related conceptualisations of creativity, a concept that has drawn considerable attention in artificial
intelligence research (cf. [25, 43, 150]).
At the outset it may be remarked that there are diverse perspectives on serendipity both in the theo-
retical literature as well as in applied work. Usage of the term is particularly ambiguous when viewed
across different computational sub-fields. In the recommender systems context, the dominant, though
not exclusive view is that serendipitous recommendations characterise items that are both surprising and
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valuable for the user [98, 140]. In planning, serendipity is “supposed to be driven by unexpected plan
successes, expected but uncertain opportunities, and unexpected plan failure” [165], as for example in the
onboard planner for NASA’s Deep Space One mission [164]. In their human-robot interaction scenario,
Chakraborti et al. [36] consider serendipity to be “the occurrence or resolution of facts in the world such
that the future plan of an agent is rendered easier in some measurable sense.” Here, the robot engages in
planning in order to help achieve a human-sought goal. However, this understanding appears to conflict
with the typical understanding of the concept of serendipity in a scientific context [186], to be illustrated
below. This diversity further motivates a return to the foundational literature.
2.1. Etymology and selected definitions
The English term “serendipity” derives from Horace Walpole’s interpretation of the first chapter of
the 1302 poem Eight Paradises—in a French translation of an intermediate Italian version of the Persian
original—written by the Sufi poet Amı¯r Khusrow [184, 230]. Related folktales tell similar stories [148,
p. 225]. The term “serendipity” first appears in a 1757 letter from Walpole to Horace Mann:
“This discovery is almost of that kind which I call serendipity, a very expressive word . . .You
will understand it better by the derivation than by the definition. I once read a silly fairy
tale, called The Three Princes of Serendip: as their Highness travelled, they were always
making discoveries, by accidents & sagacity, of things which they were not in quest of [.]”
[236, pp. 407–408]
Following Walpole’s coinage, “serendipity” was mentioned in print only 135 times over the next 200
years, according to a survey carried out by Robert Merton and Elinor Barber, collected in The Travels and
Adventures of Serendipity [157]. Merton described his own understanding of a generalised “serendipity
pattern” and its constituent parts as follows:
“The serendipity pattern refers to the fairly common experience of observing an unantici-
pated, anomalous and strategic datum which becomes the occasion for developing a new
theory or for extending an existing theory.” [158, p. 506] [emphasis in original]
In Merton’s account, the unanticipated datum is observed while investigating some unrelated hypothesis;
it is a “fortuitous by-product” (ibid.). It is anomalous because it is inconsistent with existing theory or
established facts, prompting the investigator to try to unravel the inconsistency. The datum becomes
strategic when the implications of such investigations are seen to suggest new theories, or extensions of
existing theories.
Roberts [186, pp. 246–249] records 30 entries for the term “serendipity” from English language dic-
tionaries dating from 1909 to 1989. While classic definitions required an accidental discovery, as per
Walpole, this criterion was modified or omitted later on. Roberts gives the name pseudoserendipity to
“sought findings” in which a desired discovery nevertheless follows from an accident. Makri and Bland-
ford [143, 144] point to a continuum between sought and unsought findings, and highlight the role of
subjectivity both in bringing about a serendipitous outcome, and in perceiving a particular sequence of
events to be “serendipitous.” Many of Roberts’ collected definitions treat serendipity as a psychological
attribute: a “gift” or “faculty.” Along these lines, Jonathan Zilberg asserts:
“Chance is an event while serendipity is a capability dependent on bringing separate events,
causal and non-causal together through an interpretive experience put to strategic use.” [250,
p. 79]
Numerous historical examples exhibit features of serendipity and involve interpretive frameworks
that are deployed on a social rather than on an individual scale. For instance, between Spencer Silver’s
creation of high-tack, low-adhesion glue in 1968, Arthur Fry’s invention of a sticky bookmark in 1973,
and the eventual launch of the distinctive canary yellow re-stickable notes in 1980, there were many
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opportunities for Post-its® to not have come to be [78]. Merton and Barber argue for integrating the
psychological and sociological perspectives on serendipity:
“For if chance favours prepared minds, it particularly favours those at work in microenvi-
ronments that make for unanticipated sociocognitive interactions between those prepared
minds. These may be described as serendipitous sociocognitive microenvironments.” [157,
p. 259–260]
Large-scale scientific and technical projects generally rely on the convergence of interests of key ac-
tors and various other cultural factors. For example, Umberto Eco [66] describes the historical role of
serendipitous mistakes, falsehoods, and rumours in the production of knowledge.
2.2. Theories of serendipity and creativity
Serendipity is typically discussed in the context of discovery. In everyday parlance, this concept is
often linked with invention or creativity [112]. However, Henri Bergson drew the following distinction:
“Discovery, or uncovering, has to do with what already exists, actually or virtually; it was
therefore certain to happen sooner or later. Invention gives being to what did not exist; it
might never have happened.” [15, p. 58]
We suggest that serendipity should be understood in terms of both discovery and invention: that is,
the discovery of something unexpected in the world and the invention of an application for the same.
Indeed, these terms provide convenient labels for the two-part model introduced by André et al. [5],
encompassing the “chance encountering of information” followed by “the sagacity to derive insight from
the encounter.” McKay [154] draws on the same Bergsonian distinction to frame her argument about the
role of serendipity in artistic practice, where discovery and invention can be seen as ongoing and diverse.
This underscores the relationship between serendipity and creativity.
While definitions of creativity vary, two standard criteria are variously given as “novelty and utility,”
or “originality and effectiveness” [26, 166, 188]. With a somewhat different emphasis, Cropley [52]
draws on Austin [8] to infuse his concept of creativity with features of chance, and understands a creative
individual to be someone who “stumbles upon something novel and effective when not looking for it.”
However, Cropley questions “whether it is a matter of luck,” because of the work and knowledge involved
in the process of forming an assessment of one’s findings. Campbell [31] argues that “all processes
leading to expansions of knowledge involve a blind variation-and-selective-retention process.” However,
Austin [8, p. 49] remarks that: “Nothing [suggests that] you can blunder along to a fruitful conclusion,
pushed there solely by external events.”
Csíkszentmihályi describes creativity much along the lines of Merton’s unanticipated, anomalous,
and strategic datum, as it arises and develops in a social context.
“[C]reativity results from the interaction of a system composed of three elements: a culture
that contains symbolic rules, a person who brings novelty into the symbolic domain, and a
field of experts who recognize and validate the innovation.” [54, p. 6] [emphasis added]
In this case, novelty is attributed to “a person”: even so, it is reasonable to assume that this person’s
novel insights rely at least in part on the observation of data. Csíkszentmihályi’s three-part model of the
creative process can be compared with his five-part phased model, comprising preparation, incubation,
insight, evaluation, and elaboration [54, pp. 79–80] (adapting Wallas [235]). Campos and Figueiredo
[33] use this later model to describe instances of serendipitous creativity.
The more elaborate model is also a near match to the process-based model of serendipity from Law-
ley and Tompkins [130], centred on a sequence of component-steps: prepared mind, unexpected event,
recognise potential, seize the moment, amplify effects, and evaluate effects. However, Lawley and Tomp-
kins’s model includes a feedback loop between “recognising potential” and “evaluating effects” that has
no parallel in the Wallas/Csíkszentmihályi model. Moreover, they remark:
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Serendipity is · · ·
discovery invention (1)
chance encountering of information sagacity to derive insight (2)
symbolic rules
(that do not directly account for
newly-encountered data)
novelty validation (3)
findings inspiration research focus (4)
unanticipated datum anomalous datum strategic datum new or modified theory (5)
preparation
(including
observations)
incubation insight evaluation elaboration (6)
prepared mind unexpectedevent
recognise
potential
seize the
moment
amplify
effects
evaluate
effects (7)
new connection project value exploitconnection
valuable
outcome
reflect on
value (8)
perception
of a
chance event
attention
to salient
detail
focus shift
achieved
by interest
explanation
of the event
bridge to a
problem
valuation
of the result
(9)
︸                                                                                                                                         ︷︷                                                                                                                                         ︸
All of which are operations of a prepared mind subject to chance.
Table 1: Aligning ideas from several theories of serendipity and creativity. Rows 1-7 show increasing detail, moving from two
to six phases; row 8 bundles two of the steps together; row 9 summarises our analysis and provides the framework for Section 3.
Sources: (1) Bergson [15]; (2) André et al. [5]; (3) Csíkszentmihályi [54]; (4) Allen et al. [3]; (5) Merton [158]; (6) Wallas [235]
(as adapted by Csíkszentmihályi); (7) Lawley and Tompkins [130]; (8) Makri and Blandford [143].
“[S]ometimes the process involves further potentially serendipitous events [a]nd sometimes
it further prepares the mind (at which time learning can [be] said to have taken place)” [130]
Makri and Blandford [143] propose a model that adapts Lawley and Tompkins, notably by combining
the “prepared mind” and “unexpected event” into one first step, a new connection, which involves a “mix
of unexpected circumstances and insight.” Expanding on the notion of a feedback loop, they suggest that
a parallel process of reflection into the “unexpectedness of circumstances that led to the connection and/or
the role of insight in making the connection” is important for the subjective identification of serendipity.
Projections of value can be updated when the new connection is exploited—for example, when it is
discussed with others.
Allen et al. [3] studied how the term serendipity and its various synonyms and related terms have
been used to describe opportunistic discovery in the biomedical literature. Three categories of usage
were particularly salient: inspiration, mentioned findings, and research focus. These categories of usage
roughly parallel Merton’s serendipity pattern and Csíkszentmihályi’s three-part creativity framework. A
fourth category, systematic review, highlighted scholarly interest in the topic of serendipity itself. On this
note, Björneborn [22] surveys several theoretical treatments beyond those mentioned above, and extracts
diverse personal and environmental factors that can promote serendipity. We will engage with his work
later on, but for now, we have enough material to assemble themes in line with our objective.
2.3. Distilling the literature into a framework
The different treatments of serendipity in many cases appear to build on one another, and in all cases
appear to be roughly aligned. Accordingly we can distil from the foregoing survey into a framework that
describes serendipitous phenomena in terms of six phases: perception, attention, interest, explanation,
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bridge, and valuation. Table 1 shows graphically how we have drawn out these concepts. In the following
paragraphs, we trace through the rows of Table 1 line by line, resummarising earlier perspectives on
serendipity and drawing connections between these earlier theories and our framework. Here we use
boldface to distinguish elements of earlier theories, and italics to distinguish elements of our framework.
(1) We take Bergson’s [15] notion of discovery to entail perception and attention, triggering interest.
In cases of serendipity, we understand invention to build on a discovery, through the generation
of a novel explanation and a bridge to a newly identify problem that the explanation solves. The
solution is then evaluated positively.
(2) Andre et al’s [5] chance encountering of information explicitly indicates perception of a chance
event. We take attention and interest to be implicit. We understand the terse phrase sagacity to
derive insight to encapsulate what we mean by explanation, bridge, and valuation.
(3) Csíkszentmihályi’s [54] three-part model of creativity concerns interactions between a Domain, a
Field, and an Individual (often collectively abbreviated as“DFI”). In cases of serendipitous creativ-
ity, we understand the following to occur. A chance event is perceived that cannot be fully explained
when attended to through the rubric of known symbolic rules which comprise a specific cultural
Domain. A creative Individual is then inspired by the event’s novelty to achieve a focus shift,
namely, to examine the unexplained details and generate an—a fortiori also-novel—explanation
of the event. Finally, their finding is validated by a Field of experts when the explanation can
be bridged to some (new or existing) problem that it solves, in which case the process is deemed
creative, and given a positive evaluation.
(4) Allen et al’s [3] category of mentioned findings suggests perception of a chance event and atten-
tion to salient detail; their category inspiration suggests interest and focus shift leading to an effort
to explain the event with a research design that explores the serendipitous inspiration; their cate-
gory research focus focuses in on better understanding a “fortuitous discovery” or “unanticipated
finding” in order to establish a bridge to a problem that the discovery solves and thereby contribute
to evaluating the result.
(5) Merton’s [158] description of the observation of an unanticipated datum aligns with perception
of a chance event that captures our attention: it is a “fortuitous” discovery (p. 506). Subsequent
interest in the anomalous nature of the datum causes our focus to shift towards a strategic expla-
nation of the anomaly, leading to the bridge from the anomalous detail to new theoretical insights.
The new (or extended) theory initiated by these investigations receives an at least preliminarily
positive valuation.
(6) As described by Wallas [235], preparations (among with we include observations) afford the per-
ception of a chance event. Note that such preparations are relevant both to observing the event,
and to recognising it as unexpected. During a period of incubation, the perceiver’s attention may
be turned towards salient details that can lead to an insight which then leads to an explanation of
the event. Here we run into some terminological collisions. What we call the bridge to a problem
could be linked to the insight stage, but we may also think of it as rather close to what Wallace
calls evaluation, insofar as the problem that is identified at this stage is what makes the insight
useful. In the phase of elaboration (introduced by Csíkszentmihályi) the finding undergoes further
evaluation in new contexts.
(7) In Lawley and Tompkins’s model [130], the prepared mind is relied upon at several stages in the
process; indeed, as we described above, we see the prepared mind as vitally active throughout. In
the first instance, we can connect it with these authors’ usage of the term “perception.” As we noted
earlier with reference to Clark’s theory of predictive processing, the mind’s previous preparations
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are what make the unexpected event unexpected. Previous preparations can either prevent or allow
recognising potential in a given observation, in part because these preparations constrain how and
whether the individual pays attention to the event, and whether or not they become interested.
Only when the aforementioned steps have occurred might the person seize the moment to form a
contextual explanation of the event; and amplify effects by finding a bridge to a problem that the
explanation can solve. Once all of this is done, then the agent may evaluate effects. Note the role
for a prepared mind in our sense—as active throughout the process—in supporting the “iterative
circularity” that Lawley and Tompkins say may motivate several passes of recursion over the steps
between evaluating effects and recognising potential, as well as the role of chance in producing
opportunities to learn.
(8) Makri and Blandford [143] follow Lawley and Tompkins in including feedback loops explicitly
in their model. We understand their new connection to be formed by the perception of a chance
event and attention to salient detail which then leads the potential experiencer of serendipity to
project value. This subsequently leads to active interest when the individual in question exploits
the new connection in some explicable way. Makri and Blandford assert that this result is already
a valuable outcome, i.e., it solves some problem directly; by reflecting on its value the agent
may bridge to a (further) problem. An interesting aspect of the Makri and Blandford model is that
valuation is somewhat ongoing, and that reflecting on value may feed back into the earlier part of
the process that projected value, leading to renewed interest. As the process iterates, it would seem
that additional bridges to new problems are created, or that some particular problem is understood
in more detail.
2.4. Design requirements for each phase
Here we work from a computational perspective to justify the need for each of the six dimensions, and
to outline what would be required at each phase in order to support its functioning in a computational sys-
tem. The considerations below are expanded in Section 3. However, the description here already shows
the significant demands that the concept of serendipity will impose on any computational implementation.
Perception of a chance event. People can perceive a wide range of inputs using the six senses; however
machines have a much more varied set of possible inputs. To enable computers to “perceive,” we need
to equip them with sensing apparatus and, more broadly, interfaces with the world and other systems. In
order to have any potential for serendipity, the machine will need to have a prepared mind that can cope
with input streams that exhibit unexpected chance behaviour. A computational perspective allows us to
explicitly bring to light system-internal events as one possible source of chance.
Attention to salient detail. The system must not only process events, but also find patterns, as these arise
by chance. The system should not simply wait to encounter special predefined keywords or trigger-
phrases. A system should be able to use knowledge from its foundational prepared mind to identify what
is salient (and what is not), and accordingly engage selectively with its input.
Focus shift achieved by interest. The system should include the further ability to select tasks that are
appropriate to events that it designates as being of interest. It should be able to recognise (using the
foundation of the prepared mind) those features that are worth shifting focus to, as distinct from those
which are salient in some way but not sufficiently interesting to warrant a focus shift.
Explanation of the event. Finding correlations in data is achievable via data mining, pattern detection and
machine learning—however still more is needed for this aspect of serendipity. Specifically, causal links
need to be established, based on the knowledge in the system’s prepared mind. These may be expressed
in explicit functional or operational terms, or statistical models.
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Bridge to a problem. Once a theory is established that makes a particular event salient, interesting, and
explicable, the system will need some capability to abstract its new theory so that it can be applied.
Moreover, we consider serendipity to not just be problem solving, but to integrally involve problem
identification. That is, it is not enough to create a new theory, but the system must also be able to
establish a new context in which that theory is relevant. It must draw on its prepared mind to do so.
Valuation of the result. Serendipity results in discoveries or inventions that are seen to be interesting,
aesthetically valuable, or to have other positive features. A system with serendipitous potential should
use its prepared mind to evaluate the results (and potentially also the processes involved), so as to make
some determination of their value.
Note that while we explicitly require chance in the first phase, perception, it could play a role at any
of the further stages as well.
2.5. Summary
Our review of significant literature on serendipity has led us to the key features of system operation
that can be described as serendipitous. Underpinning our analysis are foundations based on the role of
chance and the prepared mind. Highlights are summarised in Table 1, and the foregoing sections have
explained the terms in the table. Building on the literature surveyed above, we can describe serendipity
as a form of creativity that happens in context, on the fly, with the active participation of a creative agent,
but not entirely within that agent’s control. In Section 2.4 we have highlighted further specifics.
While the various theories we have examined differ from one another about just where “insight” takes
place in the process—and some do not mention this term—none of them seems to endorse a theory of
uninsightful serendipity. Nevertheless, Copeland [46] has argued that “the insight of the individual is in-
sufficient for bringing about a serendipitous, scientific discovery,” and makes a case for an understanding
of serendipity that “goes beyond the cognitive.” We agree with Copeland that a contextual perspective is
necessary, and we will return to this theme in what follows: nevertheless an agent (or agency, per Minsky
[160]) that experiences serendipity is also necessary, and a natural place to begin modelling work.
3. A computational model and evaluation framework for assessing the potential for serendipity in
computational systems
This section develops cognitively and computationally realistic definitions for each of the six concepts
from our synthesis of theories in Section 2. We begin in Section 3.1 with a high-level schematic diagram
that shows how the six phases might in principle be manifested together in a computational system. To
demonstrate that the schematic realistically captures common understandings of serendipity, we use it to
redescribe a famous historical case of serendipity: the invention of PostIt® Notes at 3M. This helps us
flesh out the requirements given in Section 2.4, and prepares the ground for Section 3.2, where we present
informally-stated but practically-inspired definitions of each of the six terms. We support the definitions
with existing foundational theories from philosophy and cognitive science, and, for each, outline a set of
heuristics that could inform future implementation work, inspired by existing implementations.
Each of the six phases in the model has a wide horizon, often encompassing both good-old-fashioned
AI and contemporary approaches. For example, “Machine Perception and Artificial Intelligence” is the
title of a book series published byWorld Scientific that began in 1992 and currently contains 83 volumes.2
We must therefore be selective rather than comprehensive in our approach to the literature. Our overall
aim is show that how computationmight be employed to produce serendipitous results. Section 4 will then
use this model to comprehensively assess the potential for serendipity in discrete implemented systems.
2https://www.worldscientific.com/series/smpai
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3.1. A process model and rational reconstruction of a historical case study
Discovery:
generative
process
E
perception
feedback
reflective
process
p1p2
attention
TT⋆ «
interest
[Focus shift]
Invention: verification
experimental
process
p′1p
′
2
explanation
M
creative
process
bridge
P
evaluation
process
valuation
...
Figure 1: A boxes-and-arrows diagram, showing one possible process model capable of producing serendipitous results.
Figure 1 places the six phases discussed above into a diagram outlining the idealised implementa-
tion of a (potentially) serendipitous system. Some steps are expanded in more detail than others. Other
architectures might foreground different kinds of feedback between the main steps, but to keep things
simple we have not shown all possible ways in which the process might revisit earlier steps as it runs. We
illustrate how the diagram works in a rational reconstruction of the invention of Post-Its® at 3M (quotes
below are from Fry and Silver [84]). The level of detail and specificity is intermediate between the design
requirements outlined in Section 2.4 and the definitions and heuristics that will be advanced in Section
3.2. Before developing definitions of the individual components, it is useful to have an example that puts
the whole process together, i.e, making the interconnections between the phases explicit. One immediate
challenge arises in building a rational reconstruction of the Post-Its® example: the story includes several
steps that could informally be called “serendipitous” in light of the success that follows. Our reconstruc-
tion is focused by this aim: to illustrate how a modular architecture like the one illustrated can create
serendipitous results—in this case, using a social rather than computational infrastructure.
Perception of a chance event. The first module is a generative process. In an implementation, this may
be based on direct observations of the world; it may also include system-internal sources of chance, such
as a random number generator. The output of the generative module is understood as a chance event, E,
that has been perceived by the system. It is passed on to the next stage.
Example. In the 3M case study the event of interest was generated by Spencer Silver’s work in a team
that was carrying out research on “pressure-sensitive adhesives.”
Spencer Silver: “As part of an experiment, I added more than the recommended amount of the
chemical reactant that causes the molecules to polymerise. The result was quite astonishing.
Instead of dissolving, the small particles that were produced dispersed in solvents. That was
really novel and I began experimenting further. Eventually, I developed an adhesive that had
high ‘tack’ but low ‘peel’ and was reusable.”
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Here we take E to include not only the bare fact of the adhesive’s creation, but also Silver’s preliminary
assessment. Simply put, the new high-tack, low-peel, adhesive would not have been created had the reac-
tion not captured Silver’s attention and interest. However, we certainly cannot explain the serendipitous
invention of Post-Its® with reference to these acts alone. With regard to social infrastructures, as Minsky
[160, p. 23] remarked, “It is not enough to explain only what each separate agent does. We must also
understand how those parts are interrelated—that is, how groups of agents can accomplish things.”
Attention to salient detail. In this stage certain aspects of E will be marked up as being of potential
interest, leading to T in the figure. This designation does not in general arise all at once. T is considered
to be the result of feedback, an abstraction over a more complex reflective process. In Figure 1, the
reflective process makes use of two primary functions: p1 notices particular aspects of E, and another, p2,
applies processing power and background knowledge to enrich E with additional information. We could
call p1 awareness, and p2 concentration. There may be several rounds of feedback applied (recursively)
in order to construct T . Looking ahead to the next phase, T will serve to trigger subsequent interest: but
notice that the system is explicitly involved in creating T , which does not simply arrive wholly formed.
Nevertheless, at this stage there is little direct evidence of how it will be used later.
Example. In the 3M case study the key aspects of the reflective process were implemented by Silver
(who spread awareness of the new adhesive) together with other employees (who developed a prototype
product and gave the topic further concentration).
Spencer Silver: “[T]he company developed a bulletin board that remained permanently tacky
so that notes could be stuck and removed. But I was frustrated. I felt my adhesive was so
obviously unique that I began to give seminars throughout 3M in the hope I would spark an
idea among its product developers.”
Art Fry: “I was at the second hole on the golf course, talking to the fellow next to me from the
research department when he told me about Spencer Silver, a chemist who had developed an
interesting adhesive. I decided to go to one of Spencer’s seminars to learn more. I worked in
the Tape Division Lab, where my job was to identify new products and build those ideas into
businesses. I listened to the seminar and filed it away in my head.”
Focus shift achieved through interest. The trigger T thus consists of the original event, E, together with
a range of newly-added metadata and markup. A focus shift selects («) some elements from this complex
object, potentially using them to retrieve additional data. The result is “of interest,” denoted above by T⋆.
Example. In the 3M case study, the information that Fry had filed away before (T ) became interesting
when he realised that he “had a [related] practical problem” (T⋆).
Art Fry: “I used to sing in a church choir and my bookmark would always fall out, making
me lose my place. I needed one that would stick but not so hard that it would damage the
book. The next morning, I went to find Spencer and got a sample of his adhesive.”
In this case, the adhesive becomes interesting insofar as it could potentially used to create a re-stickable
bookmark. 3M allowed its employees to selectively allocate 15% of their time [78], and Fry decides to
initiate his own experiments.
Explanation of the event. The now-interesting trigger T⋆ is submitted for verification, which Figure
1 depicts as an abstraction over an experimental process, whose operations here again consist of two
primary functions: theory generation, p′1, and theory checking, p
′
2. The result of this process is a model,
M. The dashed arrow in the diagram is meant to indicate that the focus shift stage may be revisited
and new selections made as this process progresses, i.e., T may become interesting for new or different
reasons as the experimental process progresses.
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Example. In the 3M case study, Fry already has in mind the theory (p′1) that re-stickable bookmarks can
be made using the new adhesive. Fry creates and adjusts a working prototype (p′2) on the way to verifying
his theory.
Art Fry: “I made a bookmark and tried it out at choir practice; it didn’t tear the pages but
it left behind some adhesive. I needed to find a way to keep the particles of the adhesive
anchored to the bookmark. After a few experiments, I made a bookmark that didn’t leave
residue and tested it out on people in the company.”
Note that in this case the event E has not been explained in terms of “how” but rather, contextually, in
terms of “so what?” The nature of the explanation will differ from case to case. The common feature is
the creation of a causal model of some sort. In this case, the causal model M is a method for creating
re-stickable bookmarks that don’t leave residue.
Bridge to a problem. Here the system forms a connection (“bridge”) between the explanation in the form
M and some as-yet-unspecified problem, P. The schematic represents this step in one block, a creative
process. This is clearly underspecified, but we shall describe different possible implementation strategies
shortly, in Section 3.2.
Example. Let’s see how this process worked in the 3M case study. Fry now had a prototype, but so far
it didn’t solve a very interesting problem. (“They liked the product, but they weren’t using them up very
fast.”) But then:
Art Fry: “[O]ne day, I was writing a report and I cut out a bit of bookmark, wrote a question
on it and stuck it on the front. My supervisor wrote his answer on the same paper, stuck it
back on the front, and returned it to me. It was a eureka, head-flapping moment – I can still
feel the excitement. I had my product: a sticky note.”
It would seem that no one, including Fry, had thought about this problem before: how can we easily
make notes on a document, without marking up the document itself, and without introducing other sep-
arate sheets of paper that would need to be stapled or paper-clipped to the document, or that might get
lost?
Indeed, without knowing the solution in advance, or having M in mind and re-stickable bookmarks to
hand, the problemmight even sound like a contradiction in terms. It would probably have been impossible
to solve it very well using conventional methods [4, p. 90]. But remember that Fry was part of the Tape
Division. By cutting off a piece of the bookmark, and affixing it to the front of the report, he was using the
bookmark like one might have used a piece of tape—which would have been another semi-conventional
solution, different from staples and paperclips, for affixing a separate sheet of paper. However, the new
“sticky note” had several advantages over tape: it could be written on directly and easily removed later.
Thus, we may rationally reconstruct the bridge to P via an intermediate virtual solution of a note taped to
the report’s cover.
Valuation of the result. The new problem, P, which now conveniently has a solution in the form of
M, is passed to an evaluation process, and, from there, to further applications. One possible class of
applications would be a change to any of the modules that participated in the workflow, corresponding to
the potential for learning from serendipitous events noted by Lawley and Tompkins [130].
Example. The 3M example shows that evaluation can itself be a complex process:
Art Fry: “We made samples to test out on the company and the results were dramatic. We
had executives walking through knee-deep snow to get a replacement pad. It was going to be
bigger than Magic Tape, my division’s biggest seller. In 1977, we launched Post-it Notes in
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four cities. The results were disappointing and we realised we needed samples. People had
to see how useful they were. Our first samples were given out in Boise, Idaho and feedback
was 95 per cent intent to re-purchase. The Post-it Note was born.”
Notice that in this case the approach to valuation is itself updated on the fly.
3.2. Definitions of the model’s component terms
We now present short definitions of each component, which we support with references to founda-
tional literature from cognitive science and philosophy, as well as heuristics that relate to the current status
of implementation work as evidenced by computing literature. Our thinking in this section is informed
by the “predictive processing” framework advocated for example by Clark [38], building on the work of
Friston [81] and others. A central idea in such theories is that perceived events are only passed forward
to higher cognitive layers if they do not conform with our prior expectations. This perspective highlights
the fact that, going beyond Pasteur’s famous idiom, chance not only favours, but also shapes the prepared
mind. Thus, for example, Boden [26, p. 137] notes that “neural networks learn to associate (combine)
patterns without being explicitly programmed in respect of those patterns.”
Multi-level architectures abound in AI; one example comes from Singh and Minsky [203], where
the first level beyond “innate reactions” is “learned reactions”; higher levels include “deliberative think-
ing”, “reflective thinking”, “self-reflective thinking” and “self-conscious thinking.” Sloman and Scheutz
[206] place somewhat similar concepts in a two-dimensional schema which they suggest can be used
to compare different architectures. Reading left-to-right, their schema concerns classically computa-
tional input, processing, and output dimensions, namely perception/central processing/action; reading
bottom-to-top, it concerns cross-cutting varieties of control: reactive mechanisms/deliberative reasoning/
meta-management. While sharing similar concepts of hierarchical control, theories based on predic-
tive processing “upend” classic input/output models, recentring on thermodynamic energy transfer: their
models of control are continuous and “there are no disconnected moments of perception of the world,
since the world wholly envelops the agent throughout its lifespan” [135, pp. 9–10]. Kockelman [122]
develops a related line of thinking from a semiotic perspective, pointing out that processes of “sieving”
and “selection” are not just properties of the mind but also of the environment. Upon considering these
reflections, we cannot subscribe to the view that serendipity is “a process of discoveringwith a completely
open mind” [58]. The mind will in general have been shaped by previous interactions with the world.
Furthermore, while we necessarily must present the phases of our model in order, we hereby make
explicit the assumption that phases encountered earlier can be returned to from temporally-later ones.
Because the phases build on one another, we propose that they must be encountered in temporal order,
backward-directed moves notwithstanding. In other words, we allow the process to jump backward, and
only jump forward to steps that have been encountered already. This does not imply that future steps
are always entirely impossible to anticipate, however. Thus, for example, Pasteur’s research has been
described as “use-inspired” [212]; pseudoserendipitous discoveries, such as the process of vulcanisation
or the treatment of disease with safe antibiotics were pursued in broad outline long before the details
became clear [79, 90].
In this respect we note that Friston’s model of predictive processing makes more specific and detailed
assumptions about structure and interconnection than we will adhere to here, namely that “error-units
receive messages from the states in the same level and the level above; whereas state-units are driven by
error-units in the same level and the level below” [81, p. 297]. In simpler biologically-inspired terms, “the
brain generates top-down predictions that are matched bottom-up with sensory information” [29, p. 2].
The mismatch between sense data and existing ubiquitously generative models is how prediction errors
are said to arise, which the system then strives to correct. Here, the simpler account of interconnections
between the modules that we developed in Section 3.1 guides our work. Our model also has integral
generative aspects, but they differ at the different phases.
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To emphasise, our intention in this section is to give a plausible general account of the six phases from
which our model is comprised: we offer a top-down analysis. Accordingly, we do not give exhaustive
technical definitions, nor do we make detailed assumptions about the overall architecture. The heuristics
are intended to present practical advice that could be used to increase a system’s serendipity potential
with respect to each phase.
Definition 1 (Perception: An interface to the world). Perception allows evidence of events to enter
the system, whenever the event’s occurrence aligns with the system’s sensors.
Foundations.
System-environment relationships differ widely, and develop differently. The environment may be more
or less observable; events may appear to be more deterministic or more stochastic in nature [189,
pp. 42–44]. The system may be able to self-programusing the environment, possibly via some form
of interaction with other systems [37, esp. p. 234]. The system’s perceptual features and limitations
can vary with time, location, the state of development of the system, and other factors.
Chance can play various roles in shaping perception. For Hume [101, p. 99] chance denotes the absence
of an explanation; for Peirce [179] it is one of several fundamental aspects of reality; for Bergson
[14, p. 234], it “objectifies the state of mind” of one whose expectations are confounded. By any
understanding:
The system has limited control. The world is not entirely under the control of the system: furthermore,
perceptions necessarily constitute an incomplete picture of reality [100]. As in Figure 1 and its
accompanying discussion, our model allows events to arise through generative methods, but this
again implies a circumscribed locus of control, namely, over the generative process. Taking a
view grounded in predictive processing, Linson et al. [135, pp. 2, 17–18] emphasise the epistemic
and existential salience of generative models (and continuous action/perception loops, including
proprio- and intero-ception) for both organisms and future robots. The basic view is that “we
harvest sensory signals that we can predict” [81], though such predictions are fallible.
Heuristics.
To create the possibility for varied patterns of inference to arise, support rich interfaces. Computer sup-
port for natural language interaction remains limited; Human-Computer Interaction researchers
have experimented with a much wider range of interface designs (e.g., ranging from head tracking
and gesture tracking [228] to interaction through dance [105] and with physical models [213]).
To reduce constraints, allow features to be defined inductively. Rather than building systems that simply
notice pre-conceived features of the environment, recent research has dealt with systems that inde-
pendently discover perceptible features [162].
Organise and process perceptions differently depending on the tasks undertaken. Humans have head di-
rection and grid cells that help define our relationship to the environment, and that support spatial
navigation tasks. Similar phenomena have been reproduced in machine learning programs for sim-
ilar tasks [10, 55]. However, AI systems often operate in environments that are structured very
differently from their human analogues, e.g., by machine learning over text corpora. Rather than
adjusting the perceptions, it may be be preferable to build constraints on action that give an “explicit
characterization of acceptable behavior” [30, p. 356].
Definition 2 (Attention: Directed processing capacity). By exerting attention, the system directs its
processing power to the perceived event or aspects thereof.
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Foundations.
Adaptive attention is related to surprise. According to Clark [38], an event only draws attention when
the perceiving agent did not anticipate it.
Learning, context, and meaning begin to arise together with attention. “Punctuating events” [12, p. 301]
from a stream of data is a basic form of attention. Identifying patterns that are stable over time,
which then begin give the data “context and interpretation” [187] is another.
To some approximation, features of the environment will be attended to. This is a more specific version
of the hypothesis that hierarchical structures in the environmentwill be mirrored by adaptive agents
[198, 200]. Outside intervention may be needed to optimise learning about tasks with complicated
problem/subproblem structure [89].
Heuristics.
Attention can be understood as competition for scarce processing resources. For example, visual atten-
tion has been described this way [97], and parallels can be seen in grammar-inducing processes
[241]. Taken as a metaphor, this extends to “the mental grammar of the investigator” and the way
they “parse their conceptual domain” [62].
Attention can be time-delineated. In his design of the discovery system AM, Doug Lenat assigned “a
small interestingness bonus” [132, p. 281] to each new concept the system created. The bonus
decayed rapidly with each new task undertaken, but in the mean time made the new concept more
likely to be used. This was inspired by a similar but more complex “Focus of Attention” facility in
the blackboard system Hearsay-II [133].
Competition may be less natural when we can take advantage of parallelism. Humans have the ability to
process complex activities in parallel [23, pp. 40–42]; as we saw in Section 3.1, social infrastruc-
tures can distribute features of attention such as awareness and concentration. Joint attention is one
such important social phenomenon. In related computational work Zhuang et al. [249] describe
a system for parallel attention that recurrently identifies objects in images. It makes use of both
image-level attention and text-based proposals (the latter directed to image regions), allowing im-
age contents to be identified in a dialogue format. Xu et al. [245] also worked on image captioning,
this time using a long short-term memory (LSTM) network that independently selected image re-
gions. LSTMs are detailed computational models of neurons that are capable of learning long-term
dependencies. Xu et al trained their networks using models of “soft” and “hard” attention: the
latter did somewhat better for the metrics considered. For a navigation task, Vemula et al. [232]
had success using “soft attention over all humans in the crowd,” i.e., not simply the people who are
nearest.
Definition 3 (Interest/Focus shift: Evaluation of data relative to existing objectives). Having already
received the system’s attention, the event is now given a preliminary evaluation. This is carried out with
respect to existing objective functions, which are used to characterise the event’s relevance to the system’s
existing goals. If this evaluation is positive we say the event is of interest, and the event now triggers
further processing. We say that a focus shift has occurred if this causes a recontextualisation of the event.
Foundations.
Assess the data’s potential for strategic usefulness. In evolutionary computing, fitness is typically an at-
tribute of an agent, often modelled as a scalar value. Here, instead, we might understand the agent’s
objective functions to give rise to a fitness landscape that can drive transformation of the data the
system encounters, or cause it to be cast aside. Simonton makes use of a somewhat related concept
of fitness, distinguishing between blind and sighted selection [201, p. 159]; however, he separates
out the “true” fitness of selected items, which is understood as a measure of their utility for the
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agent (which is what what the agent or may not may be blind to) from the selection filter. Our
definition above makes no assumptions about the actual subsequent utility of selected items.
Interest is related to curiosity. Berlyne distinguished between perceptual and epistemic curiosity, while
positing a relationship between them: one “leads to increased perception of stimuli” and the other to
“knowledge” [17, p. 180]. He posited that responses would be strongest in an “intermediate state of
familiarity” which triggered conflict, whereas “too much familiarity will have removed conflict by
making the particular combination an expected one” (p. 189). Accordingly, such curiosity depends
on prior preparations. In some reinforcement learning models, a novelty bonus “acts like a surrogate
reward” and “distorts the landscape of predictions and actions, as states predictive of future novelty
come to be treated as if they are rewarding” [116, p. 554]. Whether or not novelty is interesting in
and of itself, the system’s initial assessment motivates it to look for further information or for “new
connections,” as per Makri and Blandford [143]. This effort is expected to yield a future payoff,
whether in terms of additional novelty, more efficient organisation of the system’s knowledge base,
or some other reward.
Context change is a possible basis for belief revision. Logan et al. [137] use the notion of belief revision
to model situations of collaborative information-seeking. Ground assumptions are shared in the
context of such dialogues, and can change as conversations progress. In our model, the focus shift
similarly causes the context to change, so that the ground assumptions, includingways of evaluating
data, are no longer the same. Harman [95] treated the implications of changing circumstances for
bringing about a “reasoned change of view” (p. 3); he described previous work by Doyle [64] on
the system SEAN, which incorporated defeasible reasoning, as one of only a few earlier efforts in
this area. More recently, Clarke [39] argues that belief is context-sensitive, depending for example
on purpose, and on the stakes involved. In particular, in a dialogue, the sincerety of a given remark
is linked to the context, not just to the remark’s propositional content. Our notion of interest
appears together with the focus shift because interest is what motivates bringing the event into a
new context. In the case of Velcro™, the focus shift occurred in quite a literal fashion, when de
Mestral examined burrs under a microscope. This example provides another useful mnemonic:
burrs’ hooks allow them to “hitchhike” into new contexts [107, §1.1]. Patalano et al. [174] describe
the related mental phenomenon of predictive encodings that record “blocked goals in memory in
such a way that they will be recalled by conditions favorable for their solution.”
Heuristics.
Interest can be linked to novelty in order to inspire learning. The Curious Design Agents developed by
Saunders [192] evolve artworks in respect to a sophisticated measure of interestingness. These
agents cluster artworks together, and assess the novelty of new inputs by means of classification
error. They then determine a new artwork’s interestingness by mapping its novelty to an inverse-
U-shaped curve, inspired by the Wundt curve (cf. Berlyne [18, pp. 17–19]). This model is use-
ful “in modelling autonomous creative behaviour” and can “promote life-long learning in novel
environments” [193]. A similar conception of interest is has been applied to “generate art with
increased levels of arousal potential in a constrained way without activating the aversion system,”
using a variant of Generative Adversarial Networks to motivate the creation of visual artworks that
exhibit “stylistic ambiguity” [68, p. 97]. Mathematicians, such as Birkhoff [21], have proposed
many mathematical theories of aesthetics, though philosophers have just as often refuted them
[102, p. 4]. In Jürgen Schmidhuber’s work, interestingness is positioned as the “first derivative of
subjective beauty” [195]—where beauty is understood to mean compressibility. Here, phenomena
that maximise prediction error drive curiosity. Javaheri Javid et al. [106] apply related measures
of information gain and Komolgorov complexity to evaluate and drive the evolution of 2D patterns
generated by cellular automata.
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Interest can be linked to aesthetics in order to capture varied notions of fitness. Dhar et al. [61] describe
an “aesthetics classifier” that can determine the potential interestingness of images in terms of high
level content and compositional attributes such as “people present”, “opposing colors”, and “fol-
lows rule of thirds.” Wang et al. [237] applied machine learning to a corpus of digial photographs
with ratings and reviews, and generated new textual descriptions and rating predictions based on
the crowdsourced descriptors. DARCI (short for Digital ARtist Communicating Intention) is a gen-
erative programwhich similarly links crowdsourced image descriptions to extracted features [169].
It evolves input images using a fitness function that optimises for a combination of appreciation,
defined in terms of describability, and interest, which is, as above, an inverse-U-shaped measure of
similarity to the input image.
Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Corneli andWinterstein [49] followWaugh [238] in describing com-
plexity and coherence as two key aspects of poetic beauty. With regard to their implemented sys-
tem that generates linked verse: “A reader may identify some fortuitous resonances [in the system-
generated poems] but the system itself does not yet recognise these features.” Veale [231] discusses
a related placebo effect among readers of computer-generated tweets, and the broader role that “an
active and receptive mind” plays in our interactions with the world.
Definition 4 (Explanation: Building a predictive model). By means of closer analysis, experimen-
tation, discussion, or some other concerted means of examination devoted to the newly-contextualised
event, it now receives an explanation, which constitutes a model that predicts functional, operational, or
statistical behaviours that relate the previously-unexpected event to its newly-retrieved context.
Foundations.
A new model yields an improved ability to make a prediction. Our fundamental assumptions about chance,
described earlier, insist that the perceiving agent has at best a limited ability to predict the event.
The explanation stage now enables the agent to make predictions [209, p. 389]. Explanatory success
depends on the system’s skills, and both prior and new knowledge. However, these explanations
are again limited: Swirski [220, p. 101] points out that to be effective, explanation needs “a stop-
ping rule”, e.g., “the standard causal pattern in the social sciences” requires only “a description
of the actions and the motivations behind them that were sufficient to produce a change in the
circumstances.”
There are different kinds of viable explanations. In the 3M example, the explanation focused on “so what,”
i.e., on showing that the new adhesive could be used to make re-stickable bookmarks. However,
we do not impose a practical requirement at this stage. The explanation can be related purely to
“how.” For instance, van Andel [230] describes this example: “Blass . . . happened to pass a row
of trees. He noticed that one of the trees was much taller than the others. On investigation he
found that, although the soil around the tree was dry, water was continually dripping from a nearby
leaking connection in a water pipe.” This is a fine “how” explanation: the usefulness of Blass’s
model arose only later. According to Aristotle, the fundamental question that must be addressed is
“why?” [74]: answers are to be demonstrated in terms of “principles and causes” [7, Book Gamma,
p. 81]. But crucially, even an incorrect explanation could turn out to be useful later on: “reliable”
explanations are not always correct or may only be correct within circumscribed regimes.
The system creates an explanation of the event for itself. At this stage the system is not, in general, aim-
ing to explain its behaviour to someone else, or otherwise make its behaviour transparent (in the
sense of Explainable AI [128]). Nevertheless we may think of explanation as an expository device
or “framing” [177] that relies on the system’s ability to retrieve a suitable context, and to establish
relationships between elements of this wider context. Explanatory prowess is not simply a matter
of paying attention, but depends in particular on having learned “what to pay attention to” [134,
p. 4]. Notice, then, that requirements arising in this stage can impose constraints on earlier stages:
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“the methods and assumptions on which a systematic investigation is built selectively focus the
researcher’s attention” [11, p. 131].
Heuristics.
Experiments can have limited scope and still be useful. For example, de la Maza [59] describes two im-
plementations of a “Generate, Test, and Explain” architecture. The programs involved used deci-
sion trees to connect secondary contextual information (e.g., macroeconomic indicators) to more
elementary data-driven predictions (e.g., of stock market behaviour). This work did not, however,
“refine domain theories”: the aim is solely to “connect the ‘correlations’ uncovered by the generate
and test module to the causal model provided by the domain theory” (ibid., p. 50). This is permissi-
ble: a strategic use could in principle be found later. Kulkarni and Simon’s [125] KEKADA is cited
as an example of a system that can refine the domain theory.
Given a sufficiently rich background, only a small amount of new data is needed. The term explanation-
based learning [40, 69] denotes a process in which an explanation of one event leads to a rule that
can be applied to similar events in the future. This typically requires significant background knowl-
edge. Imitation learning, learning from demonstrations, learning by example, and one-shot learning
are related concepts (see, for example, [56]). Case-based reasoning formulates background knowl-
edge as an extensive catalogue of somewhat-similar “cases”: here explanation may play a role in
determining how two cases match [1, p. 11].
Learning is less efficient, but more widely applicable, than knowing. Sussman’s [216] Hacker was able
to “diagnose five classes of mistake and adapt differentially to them, generalizing its adaptive in-
sights so that they can be applied to many problems of the same structural form” [24]. However,
“Hacker is not as good at solving blocks world problems as would be a much simpler program
that just goes about it directly with some good heuristics and a minimum of exploration. Hacker’s
justification is as an epistemological model, not as a real problem solver” [134]. Sussman-style
“critics”—that find, fix, and in future avoid planning bugs—have been widely used [73, 115, 191,
202, 246]. For example, this approach has been applied to help build video game characters that
make situationally-appropriate plans in complex, changing, environments [96].
Communication between agents can transfer causal information. Moore [161] and Cawsey [35] describe
systems that provide explanations to the user in interactive dialogues. Subsequent research com-
pared “mixed-initiative” and “non-mixed-initiative” dialogues using computer simulations [104].
However, there are other ways to share and integrate causal information when it has formal repre-
sentations [86]. As is well known from research on social dilemmas, thin communication protocols
constrain agents’ ability to cooperate; however, sufficiently complex agents can learn to cooperate
even with limited communication bandwidth [131].
Definition 5 (Bridge: Identifying or positing a problem). The system may now create a bridge con-
necting the contextual explanation of the event, generated earlier, and either (i) an existing problemwithin
the domain, or else (ii) some previously unknown problem. In both cases, the explanation is generalised
as a solution strategy. “Problems” can be modelled as objective functions, so that case (ii) entails the
generation of a new objective function.
Foundations.
It is sometimes necessary or desirable to go beyond explanation. The bridging process can be conveniently
outlined by comparing a positive example with a corresponding counterexample. Nearly 60 years
before Fleming, Eugene Semmer both discovered and also cursorily explained the curious effects
of penicillium notatum—but he did not find a bridge to the vital problem his discovery could have
solved [53, p. 75]. His “methods and assumptions” [11, p. 131] constrained his thinking.
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Two cases: pseudoserendipity versus true serendipity: “identifying” or “positing” a problem. Case (i) cor-
responds to the “eureka” or “aha” moment. This has been modelled computationally by Thagard
and Stewart [221] using a form of concept blending. These authors assert that “human creativity
requires the combination of previously unconnected mental representations constituted by patterns
of neural activity” (p. 1). The notion of a bridge is suggested, though our definition above is more
specific about what kinds of structures are to be connected. Case (ii) is where the Bergsonian dis-
tinction treated in Section 2 particularly applies, insofar as “[originally] stating the problem is not
simply uncovering, it is inventing” [15, p. 58]. In case (ii), both the bridge itself and a new problem
need to be invented. Figueiredo and Campos [77, p. 3] made the distinction between serendipity
and pseudoserendipity particularly crisp by introducing the “serendipity equations”:
pseudoserendipity serendipity
P1 ⊂ (KP1)
M ⊂ (KM)
⇒ S1 ⊂ (KP1,KM,KN)
P1 ⊂ (KP1)
M ⊂ (KM)
⇒
P2 ⊂ (KP2)
S2 ⊂ (KP2,KM,KN)
In the pseudoserendipitous case, a given problem P1 in the knowledge domainKP1 becomes solve-
able (whence, S 1) by the addition of additional knowledge, supplied by M. In the serendipitous
case, the initial set up is similar, but the result is not a solution to the original problem: rather, it is
a new problem, P2, together with its solution.
The bridge is transformational. Although the notation abovemakes the distinction between the two cases
clear, it somewhat disguises the principle of the bridge that is common to both. Thus, in case (i),
there’s more going on than just new information coming online which happens to make a problem
solveable. Otherwise any online problem-solving system could be seen as pseudoserendipitous.
For example, when putting together a model aeroplane, this is done piece by piece, and even the
order in which the pieces are put into place is more or less predictable. It would not be said
that either the last piece added, nor any of the other pieces that were added along the way, was
the result of pseudoserendipitous creativity. By contrast, there would have been ample opportu-
nity for pseudoserendipity to arise in the historical development of powered flight. Spenser [211,
p. 292] contends that “none of [the progress in aviation] would have happened if human interaction
hadn’t evolved just as dramatically,” which suggests that the process could not have been planned
in advance. To consider another simple example, assembling a jigsaw puzzle is not an entirely
predictable process: it involves chance at the outset, but nevertheless, the overall structure of the
solution process is well understood. Even if a previously missing piece was suddenly supplied,
which made the puzzle solveable, this would not be a bridge. In short, both pseudoserendipitous
and serendipitous creativity involve “the transformation of some (one or more) dimension of the
space so that new structures can be generated which could not have arisen before” [25, p. 348].
A good problem can be identified by working at a meta-level. The bridge might be thought of as a meta-
problem, in other words, a fitness function or “aesthetic” [177], through which an entire class of
problems may be surveyed, and the most suitable one selected. Case (ii) additionally requires that
the selected problem be a novel one.
Heuristics.
Similarity, analogy, and metaphor can be used to retrieve known problems. In case (i), the problem was
either known to the system, or can be retrieved, e.g., via a search process based on analogy between
the explanation and a catalogue of existing problems. Sowa and Majumdar [210] describe three
kinds of analogies that apply to graphical knowledge structures: matching types with a common
supertype, matching isomorphic subgraphs, and identifying transformations that can change the
subgraphs of one graph into another. They give as an example an analogy between a cat and a
car, found using WordNet data. In one real-world example, designers at Speedo developed a new
material to make swimmers faster by incorporating a tiny tooth-like network similar to the denticles
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found in the surface of a shark’s skin [103]. The related concept of “metaphor” emphasises the
role of a representational system in expressing an analogy. Xiao et al. [244] describe one way in
which the relevant background that is needed to interpret (or create) metaphors might be acquired.
Structure-based retrieval of source domains may give a significant boost to the creativity of the
analogies that can be constructed [63].
Concept blending may, but does not necessarily, help identify new problems. The bridge might be estab-
lished by concept blending, otherwise known as conceptual integration [75, 76]. This approach
from cognitive science that has recently received increased attention in computer science [19, 45,
72]. The method forms new combinations of existing concepts, but Fauconnier and Turner [75]
advise that “the most suitable analog for conceptual integration is not chemical composition but
biological evolution.” Nevertheless, blending can also be contrasted with simple models of ge-
netic crossover, where the only commonalities that are guaranteed to be preserved are those at at
the level of individual matching alleles. In blending, commonalities are potentially more abstract.
Finding analogies can be seen as the first step in the process of concept blending: for example,
given the analogy identified by Sowa and Majumdar, multiple different cat-car hybrids could be
devised, some suitable for nightmares, some for children’s toys. Like biological evolution, the
blending process can involve the outside world in the specification and evaluation of blends, and it
can do this in ways that combinatorial search does not. Eppe et al. [72] have implemented several
standard-use heuristics that can be used to give basic assessments to various blends, but in general
blends are evaluated contextually. Thagard and Stewart evaluate blends using an abstract simulated
model of “cognitive appraisal and physiological perception” which stands for an overall emotional
reaction [221, p. 11]. The emotions themselves represent circumstances which might be in some
sense novel, however they might just as well represent a known problem. Thagard and Stewart
focus on “problem solving” rather than problem specification. They consider an “aha moment” to
occur when there is a good match between the newly-generated combination and the background
emotions. Returning to the 3M example, sticky notes appeared as a particularly satisfactory blend
between re-stickable bookmarks and the known problem of affixing notes to documents. Indeed,
the presence of the bookmark prototype allowed a new problem to be specified—how to attach a
note in a way that would not damage the document, and would not require a separate fastener. This
problem likely would never have been considered if the only solutions to hand were the existing
conventional technologies. It was an eureka moment for Arthur Fry because he had in mind the
problem of coming up with a new product: but the product itself appeared hand-in-handwith a new
problem. The invention of Velcro™ can similarly be reconstructed as such an example, in which the
biological problem of seed propagation, and its solution of tiny hooks, is blended with the domain
of fashion to bridge to a new problem: could clothes be conveniently fastened using a hook-and-
loop mechanism? We note that de Mestral had to expend considerable further effort before he was
able to answer this question in the affirmative. This example serves to illustrate that a full solution
does not always emerge at the same time as the problem.
Working across domains can give rise to intriguing ideas. Text mining has been used to generate hypothe-
ses by first identifying bridging terms between different bodies of literature [113, 114, 218, 239].
These methods may be employed in closed discovery models where the “two domains of interest
. . . are identified by the expert prior to starting the knowledge discovery process” or open discov-
ery models where the process works “from a given starting domain towards a yet unknown second
domain” [113]. These correspond, more or less, to the two cases of Definition 5.
Experiments can give surprising insights. Experiments have been designed using both classic expert sys-
tem methods [138] as well as modern reinforcement learning techniques [155]. However, it is not
clear if any software systems are yet looking for bridges between experiments, which would allow
them to make use of the fact that interesting things can be learned when a method is applied “in
just a slightly different way” [8, p. 28], and specialisations of this, e.g., “the unexpected yield from
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a control experiment may be more fruitful than that from the main experiment” (p. 32).
Definition 6 (Valuation: Evaluation of the solution via an existing objective function). The solution
to the bridged problem is positively or negatively evaluated according to some pre-existing objective
function. This may be system-intrinsic, or specified by the system’s user or a third party.
Foundations.
Affection is based on reflection. Campbell [32] highlights the idea of “rational exploitation” and the “dis-
covery of something useful or beneficial” as key aspects of serendipity. But some processing may
be required to get to that point. Here we may refer to the Bergsonian distinction between “percep-
tions” and “affections” [60, p. 23]. Affection is the “feeling in the instant”, which is “‘alloyed’ to
other subjectivities [. . . ] as we understandwhat we feel and act upon it” [217, p. 141]. In particular,
Bergson [16, p. 17] considers affections to be directly linked to the self-knowledge a being has of
its body. A system’s evaluation of the new state of affairs brought about by the processing stages
outlined in Definitions 1–5 might be described as “affective” when a new system configuration is
brought about that is then assessed in some reflexive way. Raw somesthetic sense—e.g., an archi-
tecture inspired by the instrumentation of robotic joints with hardwired position sensors—might
be alloyed with “reflective thinking” [203] that considers global aspects of the configuration and
course of action that led to this point.
Heuristics.
Model a sense of taste. The system’s taste is explicitly modelled in the case of the artworks evolved by
the Curious Design Agents described by Saunders [192].
Allow the system to use the world. As an alternative route to working with affect, a system might out-
source emotional processing to a human user, “recognise” the user’s affective expression [180,
p. 15], and use that as the basis of an evaluation.
Allow the system to shape its own goals. Whether or not the user is given a role in the evaluation process,
systems may be designed to shape their own goals [120, 204].
3.3. Summary
We have proposed a phased model of serendipity consisting of several cognitive components. We
began the section with a schematic diagram for a computational system that integrates all of these com-
ponents (Figure 1). We then defined each component with reference to theoretical literatuer and existing
software implementations, and, where they could add further clarity, illustrative examples. Table 2 sum-
marises the model that results from this analysis, highlighting examples of earlier work that support our
definitions and that show the feasibility of the overall proposal.
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Perception Attention Interest/Focus Shift Explanation Bridge Valuation
Interface to world
• Russell and Norvig -
different kinds of
environments
• Hume/Peirce - chance
is negative/fundamental
• Hoffman et al. -
adaptivity of not seeing
reality as it is
• Friston - we sense
what we can predict
Directed processing
power
• Clark - prediction error
• Singh and Minsky -
layered architecture
• Bateson - changing
behaviour
• Rowley - meaning
making
Evaluation of data via
existing objective
functions
•Wundt curve
• Berlyne - epistemic
and perceptual curiosity
• Logan et al. - belief
revision in information
seeking
• Patalano et al. -
predictive encodings
A predictive model
• Aristotle - principles
and causes
• Pease and Colton -
framing
• Bateson - change of
pattern
Identifying or positing
a problem (via a new
objective function)
• Bergson - creativity of
problem statement
• Thagard and Stewart -
“aha moment”
• Boden - transform the
space
• Pease and Colton -
new aesthetic
Evaluation of solution
via existing objective
function
• Bergson - affection
• Campbell - rational
exploitation
HCI, automated
feature finding,
emergence of grid cells
• Turk
• Jacob and Magerko
• Stopher and Smith
• DeepDream
• Banino et al.
Visual attention,
competition for
resources, temporal
bonus, soft attention
• Sun and Fisher
• Tsotsos et al.
• Baars
• Lesser and Erman
• Vemula et al.
Autonomous creative
behaviour, aesthetics
classifier, compression,
information gain
• Saunders
• Dhar et al.
• Schmidhuber
• Javaheri Javid et al.
Explanation-based
learning, epistemic
modelling, critics,
dialogue, integration of
causal models
• Ellman
• de la Maza
• Sussman
• Singh
•Moore
• Geiger et al.
Analogy, metaphor,
concept blending,
bridging terms
• Sowa and Majumdar
• Xiao et al.
• Confalonieri et al.
• Eppe et al.
•
Swanson and Smalheiser
• Juršicˇ et al.
Modelling taste, affect,
intrinsic motivation
• Saunders
• Picard
• Kaplan and Oudeyer
• Singh et al.
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Table 2: Our model for systems with serendipity potential. The flowchart at top provides a visual key, showing that previous phases can be returned to at any point.
The body of the table summarises Definitions 1–6, with references to previous models and existing implementations per component.
4. Testing the effectiveness of the model: Can it discriminate between systems that have serendipity
potential and those that do not?
Here we test the effectiveness of our model at discriminating between systems that have previously
been described as (in some sense) serendipitous and one example of a system that is decidedly non-
serendipitous. If the model can achieve this, that increases our confidence that the model outlines a
machine-implementable characterisation of a system’s serendipity potential.
The systems we examine are:
Mueller’s DAYDREAMER [163] – serendipity was a key concern its design (ibid., §5.3): will our
model affirm that it has serendipity potential?
A pocket calculator – such a simple system seems intuitively unlikely to exhibit features of serendip-
ity: will our model reproduce this intuitive result?
Pask’s Colloquy of Mobiles [172] – this was an interactive system that seems to have been designed
with serendipity in mind: what can our model say about the relationship between serendipity in the
system and serendipity as a service in this case?
Ramezani’s GH [182] – its serendipity potential was assessed by Pease et al. [178] using a simpler
evaluation framework, and it appears to be something of an edge case: can our more refined model
yield a decisive ruling?
We code each facet as YES, NO, or SOME, depending on the presence, absence, or partial presence
of indicators matching the definitions given in Section 3.
4.1. DAYDREAMER
The DAYDREAMER system [163] is intended to provide a computational model of daydreaming. An
agent is guided to use its ‘imagination’ to develop ideas and construct short narratives. The principle
behind DAYDREAMER is that a planning agent can operate in a ‘relaxed’ manner to explore possibilities
in unusual ways, where the relaxation state is achieved by removing or reducing constraints on the search
process that guides the exploration. DAYDREAMER’s exploration is driven by loosely constrained plan-
ning mechanisms which are given a pre-determined goal. The generated plan then becomes the basis of a
narrative. Mueller identifies a distinction between DAYDREAMER and other comparable systems:
“There are certain needless limitations of most present-day artificial intelligence programs
which make creativity difficult or impossible: They are unable to consider bizarre possibili-
ties and they are unable to exploit accidents.” [163, p. 14]
In other words, the DAYDREAMER system was designed to capitalise on the unusual or accidental non-
obvious options available to it, which gives intuitive support for Mueller’s case that it can act serendipi-
tously. We apply our model to check whether this claim is justified: details are given in Table 3.
Although there are some dimensions where DAYDREAMER could be strengthened in order to have
more serendipity potential, notably in its perception abilities and its valuation of what it does, the system
is overall a good demonstration of our model. Symmetrically, the model shows good evidence to support
Mueller’s assertion that the system does have serendipity potential. Furthermore, the system appears to
be able to manifest both pseudoserendipity and serendipity proper, as illustrated by these two examples:
(i) “DAYDREAMER receives an alumni directory from the college she attended which happens to
contain the number of Carol Burnett. DAYDREAMER had previously been daydreaming about
contacting Harrison Ford in order to ask him out again. . . . DAYDREAMER realizes that the
alumni directory is applicable to the problem of finding out the unlisted telephone number of Har-
rison Ford. DAYDREAMER could possibly find out Harrison’s telephone number by obtaining a
copy of the alumni directory from the college Harrison Ford attended, if any.” [163, p. 125].
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Perception: SOME. DAYDREAMER has access to the outside world in that it can be given
information about events, physical objects and goals as input. However, it lacks perception of
events beyond such input, and cannot steer its perception, or significantly structure the input.
Attention: YES. DAYDREAMER is able to direct processing power to pay attention to different
aspects of perception. It is able to interpret input in the context of domain knowledge, and also
in light of previous daydreams.
Focus shift through interest: YES. Information is processed and evaluated according to an
emotional component and personality traits implemented within DAYDREAMER, which deter-
mine what DAYDREAMER does and does not take note of. Focus shifts are targeted towards
achieving a particular goal. The system has an explicit notion of contexts and shifts between
them: “planning rules give rise to alternative states of a hypothetical world” [163, p. 35].
Explanation: YES. Drawing on previous experience and domain knowledge DAYDREAMER,
regularly executes a ‘predictor’ function to measure whether new conceptual steps are likely to
bring it closer to its goal.
Bridge: YES. DAYDREAMER can employ analogical reasoning to see if aspects of the plan
it is working on could be adapted to achieve some other existing goal. It can also retrieve and
reuse the plans it has previously created.
Valuation: SOME. Valuation is performed by DAYDREAMER by assessing whether the goal
it is trying to achieve has been realised. There is no valuation of the interestingness or variability
of the daydreams produced over time. The system has limited ability to select topics to daydream
about next.
Table 3: Applying our model to evaluate the serendipity potential of the DAYDREAMER system
Perception SOME. A calculator has the ability to perceive any input that is given to it by the
user. However, it has no other mechanisms for perception of the outside world.
Attention NO. A calculator pays attention equally to every input, with no ability to discern
one element over another above basic sequential processing involved in calculations. In prin-
ciple, a limited exception might be provided by a ‘memory’, ‘M’, or ‘mem’ key, which stores
particular numbers upon a user request (i.e., by pressing the key). It could be argued that the
calculator is paying particular attention to the value(s) stored in memory: however since this is
entirely directed by the user, not the calculator, we do not consider this to match our definition
of attention.
Focus shift through interest NO. The calculator evaluates data via functions, however these are
not “objective functions,” since the calculator has no goals. Even when encountering an error, a
calculator does not effect a focus shift.
Explanation NO. A scientific calculator might record a log of its work, but would not explain
the process or any aspect thereof.
Bridge NO. Calculators solve mathematical problems, one at a time; they cannot extrapolate
to solve other problems which have not been posed to them.
Valuation NO. A calculator has no concept of evaluating the correctness or fitness of solutions
it generates; it merely provides the one solution that it has been programmed to generate. It also
cannot evaluate its processes or strategies.
Table 4: Applying our model to evaluate the serendipity potential of a pocket calculator
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(ii) “[S]uppose DAYDREAMER is again concerned with how to meet Harrison Ford when it happens
to have a car accident. As DAYDREAMER is exchanging telephone numbers and other information
with the person, it notices that one way of meeting Harrison Ford is to force an accident with him.
The next time the program has the goal of meeting someone, the plan of forcing an accident with
that person will immediately be retrieved. This solution is one which would have been difficult to
generate out of thin air. [163, p. 126].
4.2. Calculator
Having applied our model as above a system that could reasonably be described as serendipitous, we
now seek to check whether the model is effective in ruling out non-serendipitous systems. Or might it
yield false positives? We consider the example of a pocket calculator (Table 4).3
Since it has an interface to the outside world, the calculator matches our definition of perception,
however, it is a poor match for the remaining features of our model. Thus, the model is effective in
showing no serendipity potential in a calculator, as we had hoped.
4.3. Colloquy of Mobiles
Gordon Pask’s Colloquy of Mobiles was one of the installations that appeared in the 1968 Cybernetic
Serendipity exhibition at the Institute of ContemporaryArts in London [183]. The exhibition itself proved
popular with the museum-going public at the time, and has been extensively discussed in subsequent
literature [67, 141, 229]. For our purposes the interesting question is whether, and how, the concept of
“serendipity” relates to one of the more famous artworks that was exhibited.
In an essay that describes the details of his installation, composed before the exhibition took place,
Pask wrote:
“[T]he mobiles produce a complex auditory and visual effect by dint of their interaction.
They cannot, of course, interpret these light and sound patterns. But human beings can and
it seems reasonable that they will also aim to achieve patterns that they deem pleasing by
interacting with the system at a higher level of discourse. I do not know. But I believe it may
work out that way.” [172, p. 91]
While the system components have been given regulatory goals which are realised in a stochastic
way, the system components are not themselves able to make any deeper sense of their communication or
behaviour. This suggests that we should make a dual accounting, and examine the potential for serendipity
on the side of the system, and compare it with the potential for serendipity on the side of the audience
(Table 5). According to our analysis, there was no possibility for serendipity on the system side, but
nevertheless there was a possibility for serendipity in the “wider” system that included human actors.
4.4. The GH System
Pease et al. [178] assessed the GH system developed by Ramezani [182]. It met almost all the criteria
for serendipitous behaviour advanced in their paper. In brief, GH solves Dynamic Investigation Problems
(DIPs), similar to the tabletop mysteries that unfold in the board game Cluedo (Clue, in North America).
However, GH fails to meet two environmental criteria advanced by Pease et al: “it only solves one task at
a time, and there are not currently multiple influences” (p. 67, emphasis in original). As we see in Table
6, the system may be understood to meet many of our current criteria in at least a partial sense, but it fails
to achieve a bridge as this concept is understood in Definition 5.
3It seems likely that a calculator could be successfully used as part of a system delivering serendipity as a service, for instance
as a source of random numbers, but we focus here on checking for serendipity in the system.
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[System]
Perception: SOME. The mobiles were given
light and sound sensors, which are linked to
their drives. The mobiles’ behaviour is con-
trolled by light and sound behaviour in their en-
vironment, which can originate from other mo-
biles or from other sources.
Attention: SOME. The mobiles have “gender
roles” which cause them to turn to one another
looking for certain behaviours to satisfy their
drives. They are, however, given only limited
attention spans.
Focus shift through interest: SOME. Once
the attention has been captured, a mobile will
change its behaviour until its drive is satisfied
or interrupted.
Explanation: SOME. The female mobiles
“were adaptive in the sense that they could learn
to identify individual males and remember their
peculiarities” [181].
Bridge: NO. The mobiles did not have the
ability to identify any problems other than the
satisfaction of their drives, nor could they strate-
gise about how to satisfy those drives beyond
the simple form of learning mentioned above.
Valuation: NO. While the mobiles continu-
ously performed local optimisations, there was
no “result” that could be valued (nor were they
given the ability to form valuations).
[Audience]
Perception: YES. Audience members were
able to perceive the installation as a whole, and
also interact with it using light and sound (and
perceive the effects of their own interactions).
Attention: YES. The museum-going public
also has limited attention spans.
Focus shift through interest: YES. Pask notes
in an appendix that audience members inter-
acted interestedly with the system [172, p. 98].
Explanation: YES. Audience members were
able to generate theories about how their “ac-
tions lead to impacts on the environment that
lead to sensing and further motivation of ac-
tions” by the mobiles [94].
Bridge: SOME. At least some commentators
were able to abstract from the exhibit to fur-
ther philosophical thinking about “what sorts of
things there are in the world, and how they re-
late to one another” [181]. “Conversational ma-
chines” were not part of everyday life in 1968,
and the system can still provoke debate [170].
Valuation: SOME. Gemeinboeck and Saun-
ders [87, p. 5] remark: “The work introduced
machinic attributes that even today still sound
very advanced to museum audiences” and it “is
in many ways as much a humorous, social ob-
servation of humans and their nonhuman coun-
terparts as it is a technological achievement.”
Table 5: Applying our model to evaluate the serendipity potential of Pask’s Colloquy of Mobiles. The system itself is evaluated in
the left column, whereas the audience’s experience of the system is evaluated in the right column.
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Perception: SOME. New data comes online in a given Dynamic Investigation Problems, and
GH has a memory of previous DIPs.
Attention: SOME. Search/inference operates with a limited scope.
Focus shift through interest: YES. GH can achieve a focus shift “if a previous case is re-
evaluated by the system as relevant to the current case” [178, p. 67].
Explanation: YES. The system can produce a proof demonstrating certain conclusions (e.g.,
the culprit in a Cluedo-style mystery or the likely cause of a disease). This is a predictive model
and thus an explanation in our sense of the word.
Bridge: NO. The system can build an expanded solution strategy by using previously solved
problems to flesh out its current challenge, however this does not amount to either problem
identification or problem creation.
Valuation: SOME. The system can assign likelihood to a given diagnoses in an online fashion,
and this confidence in the solution could be understood as the solution’s value.
Table 6: Applying our model to evaluate the serendipity potential of Ramezani’s GH system
Path dependence of a solution—in which a system happens to have the relevant preparations to solve
a given problem—is not the same as serendipity. Nor is the chance encounter of a solution the same
as pseudoserendipity. Campos and Figueiredo [33] allow the transformation of a known but unsolvable
problem into a solvable one, through the use of data acquired in an online fashion, to be termed “pseu-
doserendipity.” With Definition 5, we aim to be more stringent, and foreground the nontrivial nature of
the transformation. In our assessment, while GH attempts to solve dynamic problems, and makes use of
a memory of related problems to help solve them, it only exhibits path dependence, not bridging, since it
does not use online data to transform its problems, or its approach to solving them.
In principle, the system could be restructured to have an ongoing set of “cases” that it revisits pe-
riodically, and whereby online learning sparked in one case may (pseudoserendipitously) be bridged to
solutions in other cases. This redesign would be representative of the multiple tasks criterion from Pease
et al. [178], who discussed a similar learning architecture for a different system.
4.5. Summary
As Table 7 shows, our model can effectively discriminate between systems that have little or no
potential to be serendipitous, and computational or interactive systems that possess serendipity potential.
• DAYDREAMER meets our criteria for serendipity in the system, though two are only met weakly.
• Colloquy of Mobiles meets the criteria only when viewed as a system for serendipity as a service.
Our ruling is that GH fails to meet the full requirements of the model. Future work might address the
deficit by exploring how online learning in the context of Dynamic Investigation Problems could be
applied to as-yet-unencountered problems; or, pseudoserendipitously, if strategies used to solve new DIPs
yielded insights about how to solve known but previously-insoluble DIPs.
The serendipity potential of DAYDREAMER and Colloquy of Mobiles might be increased in further
rounds of prototyping. The source code for DAYDREAMER is online,4 and Pangaro and McLeish [170]
4https://github.com/eriktmueller/daydreamer
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are building Colloquy of Mobiles 2018 using contemporary technologies, intending to “open-source ev-
erything found and everything generated, including CAD numerical models and engineering drawings”—
so such progress may indeed be possible.
Perception Attention Interest/F.S. Explanation Bridge Valuation
DAYDREAMER SOME Y Y Y Y SOME
Calculator SOME N N N N N
Coll.-Mob. (System) SOME SOME SOME SOME N N
Coll.-Mob. (Audience) Y Y Y Y SOME SOME
GH SOME SOME Y Y N SOME
Table 7: Summary of our analysis of the serendipity potential of example systems
5. In pursuit of serendipity: An brief account of progress with computational discovery systems
In this section we will consider landmarks in a historical sequence of development of discovery sys-
tems created by two of the authors [41, 176]. This is treated via four snapshots of the development
process, each of which is evaluated using the model, to discern the serendipity potential (if any) for the
system described at that point in time.
Example 1 (HR constructs the concept of the central elements in a group). The HR system5 Colton
[41] is a general purpose machine learning tool which performs automated discovery in a variety of do-
mains. The user provides background domain knowledge describing axioms, concepts and examples,
and the system uses production rules to discover new concepts. HR then conjectures empirical relation-
ships between concepts, and evaluates its concepts and conjectures according to a set of interestingness
measures. When working in mathematics domains, it can link to McCune’s theorem prover OTTER
(Organized Techniques for Theorem-proving and Effective Research)[151] and model generator MACE
(Models And Counter-Examples) [152, 247], in order to prove interesting conjectures or find counterex-
amples. In early applications its basic mode of operation was entirely deterministic.
One early success was in the domain of abstract algebra, in which HR re-discovered the concept of
the central elements of a group (the set of elements in a group that commute with every element in the
group) [41]. This is a core concept in Group Theory that appears in most if not all basic textbooks on
the subject. HR discovered this concept by applying its compose, exists and forall production rules in the
following way:
[a, b, c] : a ∗ b = c
[a, b, c] : a ∗ b = c
}
compose→ [a, b, c] : a ∗ b = c&& b ∗ a = c
exists→ [a, b] : exists c (a ∗ b = c&& b ∗ a = c)
forall→ [a] : all b (exists c (a ∗ b = c && b ∗ a = c))
Relative to our model, the operations involved do not go much beyond those of the pocket calcula-
tor discussed in Section 4.2. In addition to perceiving new conjectures (which it generates), we allow
that these are given further attention (by testing them with examples and checking them with external
systems), but in the context of our model, that is where things stop.
5Named after mathematicians Hardy (1877 - 1947) and Ramanujan (1887 - 1920).
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Example 2 (HR refutes a boring conjecture inmonoid theory). With a view to increasing the serendip-
ity potential of HR , Colton subsequently enhanced the system so that whenever it finds a counterexample
to a new conjecture, it tests to see whether the counterexample also breaks any previously unsolved open
conjecture. In this case, the system’s “preparedmind” takes the form of previous experiences, background
knowledge, a store of unsolved problems, as well as skills and a current focus. The new counterexample
arises due partly to factors beyond the system’s control, in particular, the built-in structure of the domain.
This version of the system was tested in three test domains: group theory (associativity, identity and
inverse axioms), monoid theory (associativity, identity) and semigroup theory (associativity). When run
in breadth first mode, i.e., with no heuristic search, during sessions with tens of thousands of production
rule steps, there were no instances of open problems which were solved in this way. Amending the search
strategy to random led to one instance of a newly generated counterexample solving a pre-existing con-
jecture in monoid theory, none at all in group theory and a handful of times in semi-group theory (there
were three times when a new counterexample dispatched an open conjecture, and on one occasion, ten
open conjectures were dispatched by one counterexample). Not only was it rare, the conjectures which
were disproved in this way could not be considered interesting: for instance, the monoidal conjecture
which was an open problem disproved by a later counterexample was the following:
∀b, c, d (((b ∗ c = d ∧ c ∗ b = d ∧ c ∗ d = b ∧ (∃(e ∗ c = d ∧ e ∗ d = c)))
↔ (b ∗ c = d ∧ (∃ f (b ∗ c = f )) ∧ (∃g(g ∗ c = b)) ∧ d ∗ b = c ∧ c ∗ d = b)))
This conjecture does not appear in textbooks on Monoid Theory.
Alongside the attributes of perception and attention that were present in Example 1, we now have
evidence of a focus shift, since every newly-disproved conjecture is considered in the context of each open
conjecture, a potentially long series of (rather limited) recontextualisations. However, this evidence must
be seen as rather weak, since the same basic routine happens with each disproved conjecture, whereas
one might expect a true recontextualisation would be data-specific. The explanation phase is somewhat
better represented (namely via the demonstration that the counterexample refutes the earlier conjecture)
but the bridge is wholly missing, so the system’s findings can only be regarded as path-dependent rather
than serendipitous.
Note, as well, that mathematical theorems are generally more important than disproved conjectures,
and that the conjectures that were being disproved were very unlike the ones that might appear in a
textbook on abstract algebra. So, evidence for the valuation phase would also be quite weak, if everyday
standards of mathematical value were applied.
Example 3 (HRL undiscovers the platypus). HRL was an adaptation of HR, developed by Pease [176]
and based on a theory of argumentation that acknowledges the role of conflict and ambiguity in mathe-
matical discovery. The theory, based on the work of Lakatos [126], can also be used to describe (some)
real-world discoveries in mathematics. HRL is a distributed system, comprised of “student” and “teacher”
agents, each running a copy of Colton’s HR. The systems have different input knowledge, measures of in-
terestingness, and different ways of producing concepts. The overall system is organised into independent
work phases, and discussion phases, in which conjectures, concepts, and counterexamples are commu-
nicated. Students react to counterexamples using Lakatos’s methods. One such discussion, developed
around a simple theory of animals, progressed as follows:
A: “There does not exist an animal which produces milk and lays eggs.”
B: “The platypus does”
A: [Checks new object against current theory. Finds it breaks 11% of its conjectures]
“The platypus is not an animal”
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B: [Finds that the platypus breaks 31% of its own conjectures.]
“Okay - I’ll accept that.”
We will discuss this example together with the following:
Example 4 (HRL formulates Goldbach’s Conjecture). The same system could also do theory forma-
tion in basic number theory. Here is another dialogue:
A: [Knows: numbers 10-20, integer, div, mult]
“All even numbers are the sum of two primes.”
B: [Knows: numbers 0-10, integer, div, mult]
“2 is not the sum of two primes.”
A: [Checks new object against current theory. It fits well and doesn’t break any further conjectures]
“Okay - I’ll accept that 2 is a number. Then my conjecture is ‘All even numbers except 2 are the
sum of two primes’.”
Let’s consider whether either of examples 3 and 4 meet our criteria. The system’s basic perceptual
abilities again rely on its generative methods, drawing where relevant on external systems. Agents de-
velop concepts, conjectures, theorems, and examples that are given preliminary assessments: the most
interesting findings are shared during the “discussion phase”. This is reasonable evidence of attention.
We saw evidence of a limited focus shift even for HR in Example 2; somewhat more convincing context-
and data-specific behaviour is illustrated with HRL’s agent model, since each agent is working with its
own theory, and can independently decide what to do with the evidence shared by the other agents. Causal
models are established using external systems, which produce proofs or check for counterexamples. This
allows the system to generate simple explanations, for example, Agent A’s assertion that “The platypus
is not an animal.” In Example 3, this explanation is simply accepted, but in Example 4, Agent A uses B’s
counterexample to produce a new conjecture. The reasoning can be seen as a bridge to a new problem:
“All even numbers are the sum of two primes.”→ “2 is not the sum of two primes.”→ “All
even numbers except 2 are the sum of two primes.”
This conjecture is considered interesting by the system for roughly the same reason it is historically
interesting: it is succinctly stated but continues to evade proof. However, since the conjecture is already
well known (and remains unproved), the simple fact of its reformulation by HRL has little chance of
receiving the kind of recognition given to original mathematical discoveries—of the sort that have in fact
been made with HR [42].
In summary, HRL seems to have serendipity potential, though our analysis here shows that in itself
this does not immediately confer tangible benefits over its predecessor system. The model also highlights
areas where there is further room for improvement that could confer specific advantages. In particular,
in future development, the system might be redesigned to make more interesting focus shifts, e.g., rather
than undiscovering the platypus, the system might invent the category of monotremes and look for any
evidence of further examples. Such a requirement would push back on the perception phase, since the
system might need to select appropriate sources of data to search for examples. Taken together, this
description of HR and HRL shows how a sequence of development can unfold, bringing the features that
our model describes online one by one, and strengthening them over time.
6. Discussion
The examples in the previous sections show that serendipitous behaviour can be exhibited in a mean-
ingful sense by computer systems. The demonstration of this claim has made use of a novel theoretical
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synthesis, which, nevertheless, is compatible with other established perspectives on serendipity. We are
not the first to argue that the potential for serendipity can be increased—or, indeed, decreased—because
of technological design choices (e.g., [57], [167], [156]). However, this seems to be the first large-scale
attempt to connect theories of serendipity with the practice of artificial intelligence.
The effort incorporates an “ecological” [121] perspective on artificial intelligence, in which the system
develops in relationship to its operating environment. This bears on the concept of “self-improving” [142]
AI systems. The model of serendipity potential details one way in which such improvements can be
structured. Below, we discuss additional related work (Section 6.1), existing research that incorporates
or references our model, and directions for further work (Section 6.2), as well as three representative
application areas (Section 6.3).
6.1. Related work
We have focused on “serendipity in the system,” but Edmonds [67] arrived at a similar point by
thinking about tools that could support the serendipitous creativity of their users. He argued that studying
support tools is a useful way to investigate a broader question: how do machines interact with their
operating environment? He draws the conclusion that “we are bound to consider open system models of
the creative process rather than the closed ones implied by the TuringMachine” (p. 341). Indeed, he points
to statements from Turing himself [227] that indicate the limits of the TuringMachine model, considering
machines that allow “interference from outside,” and in which “such interference is the rule rather than the
exception.” Elsewhere Turing would use the convenient shorthand, learning machines [226]. According
to Turing’s analysis, applications such as language learning and human-level mathematics are likely to
require rich contact with the outside world. Concerning the process of learning mathematics, and with
reference to Kantian foundations, Sloman [205, p. 2015] again highlights “requirements . . . arising from
interactions with a complex environment.”
It is unsurprising, then, to learn from Swanson [219] that the predictive processing framework, which
we pointed to as an inspiration when introducing our model in Section 3.2, “should not be regarded as a
new paradigm, but is more appropriately understood as the latest incarnation of an approach to perception
and cognition initiated by Kant and refined by Helmholtz.” Kant had contended that “reason has insight
only into what it itself produces according to its own design,” and disparaged the notion of learning from
accidental observations absent “a previously thought out plan” [118, p. 20]. One also wonders, just what
can be learned from a previously thought out plan in the absence of accidents? Van Andel’s insistence
that pure serendipity cannot be manifested by a computer program seems to address this question. And
yet, the hard line that he takes on the matter might be significantly tempered if the program in question
was allowed to implement a learning machine in the sense indicated by Turing.
In fact, Kant was also led to consider something akin to unsupervised learning, which he called
reflective judgement. This process subsumes objects “under a law that is yet to be given. . . under a law
which is in fact only a principle of reflection on objects for which we have no objective law at all” [119,
p. 265]. This is not quite as different from the above-mentioned considerations regarding previously
thought out plans as it may at first seem. Reflection is a “subjective principle governing the purposive use
of our cognitive powers” [119, p. 266]. As an example along these lines, Eco suggested that, had Kant
had the opportunity to observe the platypus, he would have concluded that it is “a masterpiece of design,
a fantastic example of environmental adaptation, which permitted the mammal to survive and flourish
in rivers” [65, p. 93]. There is quite a difference between this creative line of abductive reasoning and
HRL’s reductive approach, traced in Section 5. However, as we saw in that section, given a somewhat
richer background theory, HRL was also capable of exercising something akin to reflective judgement,
and thereby reinvent a famous number-theoretic conjecture.
In Section 2.5, we suggested that serendipity is a form of creativity that happens in context, on the
fly, with the active participation of a creative agent, but not entirely within that agent’s control. We also
remarked there that Copeland [46] has argued for a contextual perspective on serendipity that “goes be-
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yond the cognitive.” While our approach has centred on cognitively-plausible computational modelling,
we have had in mind what Edmonds referred to as “open system models.” The perspective we developed
in Section 3.2 is compatible with what Tønnessen [224] calls “Uexküllian phenomenology.” Tønnessen’s
conception of a world rich in interdependence across various layers of mental processing is also compat-
ible with Copeland’s assertion that serendipity is found in networks and communities, and in mundane
social encounters.
Simonton [201, p. 158] has suggested that exceptional creativity is more likely to engage blind se-
lection mechanisms, on the view that “blind variation generates the originality of an idea.” However,
the related example of a “blind” radar search [31, p. 383] should be contrasted with Austin’s ‘barking
up the right tree’ phenomenon: “if you happen to be the kind of person who hunts afield, it may be, in
fact, your dog who leads you up to the correct tree, and to a desirable conclusion” [8, p. 50]. Kockelman
[122, p. 720] contends that just as “one cannot offer an account of significance without an account of
selection” also “one cannot offer an account of selection without an account of significance.” In order
to make good use of serendipity, systems will need to model both the anticipation and appreciation of
valuable outcomes in an uncertain world.
While Copeland emphasises that “serendipity is a category that can only be applied retrospectively to
a discovery process” [46, p. 7], she also mentions several skills and cultural traits that can be cultivated to
encourage serendipity, such as the early sharing of research results. Although we have presented the steps
of our model building on one another in sequence, feedback loops are allowed, and experimentation with
different architectures will be important. We outline several potential applications later in this section.
Björneborn [22] expands upon the theme of encouraging serendipity in considerable detail. He puts
forward three major “personal factors in serendipitous encounters”: curiosity, mobility, and sensitivity.
These correspond to three parallel environmental factors or affordances, which he terms “diversifiability,
traversability, and sensorability.” Both sides of this balance are then described in terms of sub-factors, ten
on each side. However, while Björneborn notices an interesting parallel between agent and environment,
he does not comment explicitly on a parallel with the classic theory of mind in three parts, namely the
“conative,” “cognitive,” and “affective” [99]. Links with the three personal factors mentioned can be read-
ily traced. Boden [25, p. 347] notes that creativity similarly “involves not only a cognitive dimension (the
generation of new ideas) but also motivation and emotion.” Two of Björneborn’s sub-factors, sensitivity-
attention and curiosity-interest, show up as facets in our model. However, the three dimensions may be
active more widely, which is why they were not included in Table 1.
Previous work described an information-processingmodel of insight [197], after the outline provided
by Wallas [235]. Such ideas seem to described applications of computational technology that “facilitate
the discovery of previously unknown cross specialty information of scientific interest,” as discussed by
Swanson and Smalheiser [218, p. 183], i.e., “literature-based discovery” [207]. In the approach of Swan-
son and Smalheiser, conditions of complementarity and noninteraction between two bodies of literature
suggest the presence of “unnoticed useful information,” which may be hinted at through “indirect link-
ages” [218, pp. 184, 185]. One class of explicit indirect links are bridging terms, as we noted in Section
3.2. Surfacing these connections drives at insight, if that is understood to mean “an improved represen-
tation of an important previously unsolved problem, which now likely contains the essence of a correct
solution” [197, p. 118].
The broader parallels we’ve drawn between Wallas’s model and the concept of serendipity (Section
2.3) suggest that the latter concept goes beyond “insight” to include aspects of “evaluation.” Cases of
true serendipity integrally involve what Swanson and Smalheiser refer to as “problem generating” [218,
p .186]. But in serendipity, this happens relatively late in the process, rather than at the outset as it did in
Swanson and Smalheiser’s work. Kulkarni and Simon [125, p. 153] suggested a related heuristic: “If the
outcome of an experiment violates expectations for it, then make the study of this puzzling phenomenon a
task and add it to the agenda.” By remaining open [113] to the identification and pursuit of new challenges,
potentially-serendipitous processes are able to pose and solve novel, useful, problems. As we noted in
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Section 2.4, this comes with significant demands for any implementation: our examples have shown that
these can indeed be met. However, Section 5 shows that this does not always bring immediate advantages.
To illustrate what serendipity in the system could potentially bring to the table, consider the example
of Max, a system designed to provide serendipity as a service [34, 77]. Max modelled users’ interests
as word vectors, extracted from emails; these were converted to conceptual structures using WordNet;
Max then suggested new web pages for the user to read. Max was capable of delivering, albeit with low
probability, recommendations deemed to be of considerable value, and examples of both pseudoserendip-
itous and serendipitous varieties were adduced [77, p. 59]. However, Max was not open to discoveries
in the sense described above, and as such could not carry out new use-inspired research to improve its
performance. For example, Max applied term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) to rank the
concepts in each user-supplied document [34, p. 160]—but there is no chance that the system, as ar-
chitected, would decide to try reducing the dimensionality of the associated vector space, and then use
declustering (like Auralist [248]) to see if this improved recommendation quality. The conditions that
led to the historically-significant extension of tf-idf into latent semantic analysis (LSA) are simply not
modeled in Max, even though the program was built with a somewhat-similar problem in mind:
• Landauer, who pioneered LSA: “the words that people wanted to use, to give orders to computers,
or to look things up, rarely matched the words the computer understood” [127].
• Campos and Figueiredo, creators of Max: “Information retrieval usually assumes that the users
knowwhat they are searching for [but information can also be acquired] in an accidental, incidental,
or serendipitous manner” [34].
Broadly, a rich awareness of operating domains would be necessary for systems to recognise their
own best and most interesting efforts, to identify new problems, and to exploit serendipitous outcomes
when they occur. For example, while DAYDREAMER met the basic requirements of our model, it does
not have a robust way to discriminate between more and less interesting daydreams. Nor can it adjust its
view on the world to take in new perceptions based on its creative process. Similarly, while HRL also met
the basic requirements of the model, it would need to be revised to make more considered focus shifts
that accord with existing scientific and mathematical knowledge. Therefore, these systems can only be
seen as minimal working examples that exhibit serendipity potential. We are aware of some other more
recent systems that make interesting innovations: some of these are mentioned below.
6.2. Work that incorporates or references the model, and potential for further development
We can reflect in practical terms on Copeland’s advice concerning the sharing of early research re-
sults. During the development of our model, previous iterations of the paper have been made available
via arxiv.org [50] and a relatively recent version was discussed in a symposium with leading ‘serendip-
tologists’ (see Corneli et al. [51]). To date, 17 publications have cited the working version of the paper
on arxiv.org,6 which has given us an impression of how others think about the model.
In their recent paper exploring serendipity in computer-generated fiction, Mccallum et al. [149] re-
flect on how the detail in our model “more clearly articulate[s] what must occur for the chance encounter
to be productive,” which can help designers of AI systems take advantage of the “productive and per-
ilous moment . . . in which an unexpected event or pattern occurs [that might otherwise go unnoticed or
unrecognised]” (p. 7). Wopereis and Braam [243] remark that modelling serendipity in computational
systems is a topic that is growing in interest: “Seeking serendipity may sound as a paradox, just like
controlling it, [however there is] increasing evidence that we can influence and stimulate it.” Surroca
6https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?oi=bibs&hl=en&cites=8190354202005420104&as_sdt=5 . Citation
count accurate as of 27 April 2018.
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et al. [215] noted that our work was the only instance of “the formalization and the measurement of this
phenomenon” that they had knowledge of (p. 404).
Here we should stress that quantitative measurement of serendipity potential, which we had attempted
to deal with in an earlier draft of this paper, gives rise to complications that have since caused us to beat
a retreat. A full picture of serendipitous creativity must take into account both the discoverer and the
environment, and in the valuation step, the discovery itself, if not also way it is communicated (cf. [111]).
Measuring the serendipity potential of a given system is not realistically possible without knowing a great
deal about the landscape in which that system operates. This does not detract from the possibility of oper-
ationalising the concept of serendipity potential within specific applications, as our analysis above shows,
and as we detail in further examples below. It might be possible to formalise the concept of serendipity
potential in a Solomonoff-style probabilistic treatment [208], or as a suitably formulated Bayesian rein-
forcement learning problem [233], or in some other framework, but this must be left for future work. In
addition, while we have been inspired by predictive processing and active inference, the project of for-
mally redescribing the model in terms of the situated, recursive, neural architectures frequently referred
to in that line of work is similarly deferred.
The existing model’s qualitative aspects have informed discussions of the serendipity potential of
recommender systems [124, 175] and the reporting of serendipitous events [2]. The framework was
also referenced briefly in connection with research into serendipity in revenue models [13], preference-
guided content discovery on the Web [215], computational models of curiosity [91], literary creativity
[88] and musical improvisation [243]. All of these would be interesting topics to develop further, and
such investigations would be likely to give rise to additional domain-specific heuristics. We look at three
broad application areas in the next section.
6.3. Further applications
Accounting for serendipity potential in computational systems is particularly relevant to the design
and development of systems with autonomy. Due care to the way it is modelled may provide some
built-in assurances that the behaviour of such systems will be salutary. The way the valuation stage is im-
plemented will be particularly relevant, if social values are to be incorporated in the system’s judgements.
However, requirements that apply at this stage will push back on the earlier stages as well. Furthermore,
several of the earlier stages carry out of preliminary evaluations, for which various possible use-cases will
have different requirements. To underscore these points we now consider representative application areas
in three clusters.
A. Automatic programming. Automatic programming is increasingly important in industrial applications.
Eric Bantégnie, the founder of a company that makes safety-critical software, remarks in a recent inter-
view for The Atlantic [196],
“Nobody would build a car by hand. Code is still, in many places, handicraft. When you’re
crafting manually 10,000 lines of code, that’s okay. But you have systems that have 30
million lines of code, like an Airbus, or 100 million lines of code, like your Tesla or high-end
cars–that’s becoming very, very complicated.”
Solutions to this problem include variations on the theme of model-based design, in which code is gener-
ated from a physical or mathematically formalised model of the system’s behaviour. Schmidhuber’s [194]
“Gödel Machines” are one such example. However, as the system’s complexity grows, we encounter a
problem: Minsky [159] had already envisioned systems that reprogram themselves in ways that are suffi-
ciently complex that their users simply will not be able to understand the way they work. Many modern
large-scale machine learning systems are often similarly opaque, although some current research seeks
to address this issue (e.g., Park et al. [171]). The “right to explanation” for people who are subject to
automated decision making is discussed in current legal and policy debates [234].
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In order for complex self-programming systems to realise behaviour that could be deemed serendip-
itous, criteria are needed that can make their products and processes meaningful, at least to the systems
themselves. This shifts the basic emphasis in automated programming applications from a mostly local
analysis that asks which modules can be fit together in a plan or service-oriented assembly, to a more
global analysis that seeks to qualitatively characterise the generated outputs, programmes, or behaviour.
In terms of our model, the explanation phase will play a particularly crucial role in future developments.
We also encounter challenges for autonomous valuation, and indeed, meta-evaluation, insofar as a self-
programming system may come up with new frameworks for evaluating the programs it creates, and will
need some way to evaluate these [110]. Embedding the system in a context in which it is tasked with
responding meaningfully to user-submitted prompts might provide a useful training ground [47].
B. Recommender systems. Designers of recommender systems frequently consider serendipity with the
goal of supporting discovery on the part of the end user. In Section 6.1, we discussed one such research
prototype, Max, but related considerations also apply to tools that are in popular use. For instance, an
Amazon spokesperson told Fortune:
“Our mission is to delight our customers by allowing them to serendipitously discover great
products. We believe this happens every single day and that’s our biggest metric of success.”
[145]
We discussed Max’s limitations above, but in fact a few recommender system architectures do seem to
take into account invention on the system’s side, e.g., by using Bayesian methods to generate new ways of
making recommendations [93]. However, even in the Bayesian setting, the system has limited autonomy.
In complex and rapidly evolving domains where hand-tuning is cost-intensive or infeasible, it may make
sense to build recommender systems that can more flexibly invent new recommendation strategies, not
just fine-tune pre-existing strategies. Considering such next-generation recommender systems, we can
then ask what it would mean for a new strategy to be “serendipitous.”
In effect, such an architecture would invert the flow of control that is present in current serendipity
support tools. No longer would the system simply supporting the user’s experience. User behaviour or
other underlying changes in the domain would now support the system’s ongoing development (perhaps
enacted through self-programming, along the lines described above). Accordingly, in order to bootstrap
such a system, users might be assigned tasks that are designed to trigger serendipity on the system-side.
Thus, the system would explicitly “use” the user. Techniques such as active learning—which has been
applied to make serendipity as a service more efficient [20]—might be applied to reduce the number
user-supplied ratings that need to be acquired.
This design sketch points to long-term considerations pertaining to valuation that go beyond the
anatomy of a unique serendipitous event. In particular, the short-term value of recommendations to
users (as measured by business metrics) should potentially be allowed to suffer as long as the expected
value of future, more intelligently informed, recommendations remains higher. Both data gathering and
experimentation may come at the cost of performance. Optimising the learning process itself becomes a
project for evaluation.
C. Computational creativity. Jordanous [109] reported on a system using genetic algorithms for compu-
tational jazz improvisation, which was later given the name GAmprovising [108]. One of the system’s
key limitations is its “fitness bottleneck” [109]: a human evaluator responsible for rating the typicality
and value of the generated compositions (after Ritchie [185]). Furthermore, because this takes place
iteratively, at each generation, the user is essentially responsible for all responsibilities related to valua-
tion. This also drove the system’s interest and corresponding focus shifts. Despite to these limitations,
GAmprovising was seen to have reasonably satisfactory behaviour:
“Over several runs, it was able to produce jazz improvisations which slowly evolved from
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what was essentially random noise, to become more pleasing and sound more like jazz to the
human evaluator’s ears” [109].
Clearly, a future evolutionarymusic system would be more convincing as an autonomous creative entity if
it could evaluate musical works without such involved user intervention. Interaction between the system’s
tasks and more dynamism in its influences could help differentiate behaviour within individual threads
or generations, providing a route to quite sophisticated internal evaluation. For example, perhaps the
population of evolving agents could be tuned to notice and take an interest in specific musical patterns.
Consequently, individual Improvisers would be more selective, and more variable in performance, while
the population as a whole would be more musically sophisticated. More sophisticated judgements of
quality would open the way for the system to learn identifiable musical skills and to innovate relative to
this skill set.
For comparison, Entropica is a system that seeks to maximise entropy, and it used this single ability
to make discoveries in several domains [240]; however it is not clear that any of its discoveries involved
bridging one of its skills or problems into a new domain.7
Earlier, we proposed concept blending as one possible tool to use in bridging. However, Bou et al. [27]
show that while concept blending can be applied to analyse and retrospectively reconstruct mathematical
examples, more work would be needed to build a mathematical system that convincingly asks questions
that drive the selection of items to blend. Kaliakatsos-Papakostas et al. [117] used blending in a music
context, but as for GAmprovising, their system required a human in the loop for evaluation purposes.
More recently Loughran and O’Neill [139] have drawn on the concept of “cybernetic serendipity”
in their design of a music system driven by a “‘circular-causal’ loop,” which employs a population of
evolving critics to build an emergent fitness function, which in turn guides the evolution of melodies.
This is an explicit example of the concept of a bridge, insofar as the evolving fitness function provided
by the critics gives the musical creators an ever-new problem to solve.
With regard to Harold Cohen’s painting program, Edmonds [67, p. 340] remarks “Perhaps the prime
restriction on AARON’s creativity is that it cannot see.” Although more recent computer painting pro-
grams have overcome this limitation (e.g., in Colton et al. [44]), this does not immediately translate into
richly meaningful behaviour. Mccallum et al. [149] express doubt as to whether computational art should
resemble human art in the first place: nevertheless it is still interesting to ask how their text-and-image-
based system’s perceptual capabilities might be deepened, and what new kinds of meanings this might
achieve. Beyond the criterion of perception, Guckelsberger et al. [92] characterise a range of related
issues with a series of “why questions” that creative systems would need to be able to address in order to
explain their behaviour convincingly (now in the sense of Explainable AI, which we set to one side our
comments on Definition 4).
7. Conclusions
Equipping computational systems with serendipity potential would be widely applicable across differ-
ent artificial intelligence applications. In contrast to most previous work, we focused here on modelling
serendipity in computational systems, rather than serendipity support tools.
Our model takes into account the following features which we have synthesised from existing litera-
ture on serendipity and creativity. The model concerns a system that develops a set of perceptions, using
an interface to the world. These perceptions are then subject to selective processing that induces further
structure. Certain observed data that have appeared by chance are selected as being of interest. A predic-
tive model that can explain their contextual relevance is then formed. The resulting explanatory model
is then bridged to a new—or, in the pseudoserendipitous case, existing—problem. The new unexpected
7http://www.entropica.com/
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solution to this problem is then given a positive valuation by the system, possibly acting as a proxy for a
user or other stakeholders.
Existing and hypothetical systems matching this description engage in open discovery, understood
here to incorporate both model- and problem-generation. Artificial intelligence research has long engaged
with the challenge of developing computational and robot systems that can function autonomously in
real-world contexts. Current thinking about AI policy points out considerations related to verification,
validity, security and control that can reduce the incidence of surprising behaviour in such systems [190],
but, so far, much less attention has been given to features that would allow autonomous systems to make
beneficial use of surprises they encounter in the world.
The individual components of our model of serendipitous processing have been supported with ref-
erences to both classic and contemporary systems. Taken as a whole, the model addresses learning and
adaptation in contexts with unpredictable features. The model is effective at showing evidence for or
against the serendipity potential of existing systems. We have identified two existing minimal working
examples of computational systems with serendipity potential.
The heuristics that we described can inform future implementation and evaluation work. For refer-
ence, an outline summarising the theoretical foundations and heuristics from Section 3 is collected in
Table 8. Serendipity potential can be encouraged in computational systems: further research may give
more evidence as to when it should be encouraged. Pease et al. [178] suggested to “proceed with caution
in this intriguing area.” The current paper offers a considered view of the issues at stake.
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